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FROM WOLVES, LAMBS (PART I): THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
CASE FOR GRADUAL ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Kevin Barry*
Abstract
This spring, the Connecticut Supreme Court will take up a novel
question, unprecedented in modern death penalty jurisprudence: Can a
state gradually abolish its death penalty? Restated, can it leave the
sentences of those currently on death row in place but abolish the death
penalty going forward? This Article argues that it can. On simple statutory
construction grounds, “prospective-only” repeals of death penalty
legislation are not given retroactive effect. Although the constitutional
considerations are admittedly less straightforward, prospective-only repeals
do not offend the Constitution. The death penalty remains constitutional
per se under the Eighth Amendment, and “as-applied” challenges under
Atkins and Furman fare no better.
Apart from the thorny legal question before the Connecticut Supreme
Court, prospective-only repeal gives rise to two other difficult questions.
The first is a pragmatic one: From the perspective of the abolition
movement, is prospective-only abolishment of death-penalty legislation
wise? The second is a moral one: Is it right to leave those who committed
murder on day one on death row, while eliminating the death penalty for
those who commit murder on day two? This Article answers both questions
in the affirmative. Prospective-only death penalty repeal offers both
retraction of the death penalty and preservation of the status quo. It is
therefore a useful tool for winning states with inmates on death row to the
cause of abolition. Furthermore, by retaining the death penalty for some so
that no others will ever face a similar fate, legislators transform an immoral
punishment into an arguably moral sacrifice. This is the uneasy morality of
gradual abolition; from wolves, lambs.
* Professor, Quinnipiac University School of Law. This Article is adapted from the written
and oral testimony of Quinnipiac University School of Law’s Civil Justice Clinic in support of
prospective-only legislation that abolished Connecticut’s death penalty in 2012. See Testimony of
Quinnipiac University School of Law Civil Justice Clinic in Support of Raised Bill No. 280,
Judiciary Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb. (Conn. March 14, 2012), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/
JUDdata/Tmy/2012SB-00280-R000314-Christine%20Gertsch-%20Quinnipiac%20University%
20School%20of%20Law-TMY.PDF; JUD Committee Hearing Transcript for March 14, 2012 Gen.
Assemb. (Conn. 2012), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/JUDdata/chr/2012JUD00314-R001100CHR.htm. Thanks to the Connecticut Office of the Chief Public Defender and the Connecticut
Office of the Chief State’s Attorney for their outstanding advocacy and thoughtful consideration of
an earlier draft of this Article. Thanks also to: participants at the Faculty Forum at Quinnipiac
University School of Law for helpful conversations; the Florida Law Review staff for excellent
editorial assistance; and Andrea Dupre, Christine Gertsch, and Trevor Bradley for their research
assistance.
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OPENING STATEMENT
This is an important time for death penalty abolition. The past five
years have witnessed the dawning of a new trend in the abolition
movement, that of gradual abolition, by which states eliminate the death
penalty for all future crimes while preserving it for crimes already
committed. Two factors define the trend: (1) state legislatures’ use of
“prospective-only” language—language limiting repeal to crimes
committed on or after the effective date of the statute; and (2) the
executive’s refusal or inability to commute existing death sentences after
repeal. In spring 2014, the Connecticut Supreme Court will address the
legality of this approach, which is a novel question unprecedented in
modern death penalty jurisprudence.
Importantly, the novelty of gradual abolition does not lie in the
prospective-only nature of the death penalty repeal. Over the years, many
states have enacted prospective-only legislation altering death penalty
procedures or repealing the death penalty for certain crimes and certain
types of offenders. Courts have generally upheld such repeals. Other states
have enacted prospective-only legislation—like Connecticut’s—abolishing
the death penalty for all future crimes. Unlike in Connecticut, however,
executive branches in these states have commuted the sentences of those
on death row immediately prior to or after such repeals, so no one
remained on death row to challenge such repeals. As a result, courts have
generally not had occasion to address the legality of such repeals.1
The novelty of the issue before the Connecticut Supreme Court thus
arises from the fact that the Connecticut General Assembly abolished the
death penalty for all future crimes,2 and Connecticut’s executive did not
commute the sentences of those remaining on death row. New Mexico and
1. In 1908 and 1918, the supreme courts of Kansas and Missouri, respectively, refused to
give retroactive effect to prospective-only legislation repealing their death penalties in toto. See
State v. Lewis, 201 S.W. 80, 85–86 (Mo. 1918); In re Schneck, 96 P. 43, 44–45 (Kan. 1908). Since
that time, no court appears to have addressed this issue. Because many states enacted prospectiveonly legislation abolishing their death penalties after 1918, the dearth of case law addressing
challenges to those repeals suggests that either there was no one on death row at the time of
prospective-only repeal or the executive commuted the sentence of anyone on death row at the time
of such repeal. For an excellent summary of statutes abolishing the death penalty, see generally
Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians & Scholars, State v. Santiago, 9 A.3d 566 (Conn. 2012)
(No. SC17413) [hereinafter Historians Brief], available at http://ctbriefsonline.com/Briefs/
SC17413ac5.pdf; see also Kevin Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The Fourteenth Amendment
Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
[hereinafter Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II)] (discussing the history of prospective-only death
penalty repeal).
2. An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies, Pub. Act No. 12-5, § 1, 2012 Conn.
Acts 13, 14 (Reg. Sess.), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/ACT/PA/2012PA-00005-R00SB00280-PA.htm (“(Effective from passage and applicable to crimes committed on or after said
date): . . . .”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6

316

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Maryland appear to be the only other states to have done the same in nearly
a century.3 Together, these three states retain eighteen men on death row
after prospective-only repeal of the death penalty.4
To understand the exceptional events taking place in New Mexico,
Connecticut, and Maryland, it helps to understand the context from which
they emerged. On November 5, 2005, in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
3. See An Act Concerning Death Penalty Repeal—Substitution of Life Without the
Possibility of Parole, ch. 156, § 3, 2013 Md. Laws 5, available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/
2013RS/chapters_noln/Ch_156_sb0276T.pdf (stating that, after effective date of repeal, governor
may “change a sentence of death into a sentence of life without the possibility of parole”); An Act
Relating to Capital Felony Sentencing; Abolishing the Death Penalty; Providing for Life
Imprisonment Without Possibility of Release or Parole, ch. 11, § 6, 2009 N.M. Laws 133, 141,
available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/final/HB0285.pdf (“The provisions of
this act apply to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009.”).
On November 1, 2010, a New Mexico trial court denied a “Motion to Dismiss the Death
Penalty” in the case of Michael Astorga, who committed his crime before that state’s 2009
prospective-only repeal but was convicted after repeal and was awaiting sentencing. See Response
to Petition for Writ of Superintending Control at 2, Astorga v. Candelaria, No. 32,744 (N.M. Jan.
26, 2011) [hereinafter NM’s January 2011 Response]; Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Death
Penalty with Memorandum of Law at 2, State v. Astorga, CR-2006-1670 (N.M. Dist. Nov. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter Def.’s Motion to Dismiss]. “I don’t find anything about [prospective-only repeal]
unconstitutional,” Judge Candelaria stated at the close of arguments. Scott Sandlin, Astorga Death
Penalty Trial Can Proceed, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.abqjournal.com/news/
metro/032332537958newsmetro12-03-10.htm (internal quotation marks omitted). “It’s the
Legislature’s prerogative to make a law prospective or retroactive.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Astorga filed an Emergency Petition for Writ of Superintending Control with the New Mexico
Supreme Court, arguing that it was unconstitutional for the state to pursue the death penalty against
him given New Mexico’s prospective-only repeal. See NM’s January 2011 Response, supra, at 2;
Emergency Petition for Writ of Superintending Control at 3–11, Astorga v. State, No. 32,744 (N.M.
Feb. 4, 2011) (attaching Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra). The New Mexico Supreme Court
granted a stay of proceedings and requested a response from the State. After full briefing on the
constitutional issues, the court denied the defendant’s petition and lifted the stay of proceedings.
See Order at 1, Astorga v. Candelaria, No. 32,744 (N.M. Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Feb. 2011
Order].
Because the court’s order did not expressly reserve judgment on the constitutional arguments
raised in the December 2010 Petition, it is unclear whether the court found them to be without merit
or merely inappropriate to address in a writ proceeding. Compare Feb. 2011 Order, supra (no
reasoning), with Order at 3, Astorga v. State, No. 33,152 (N.M. Sept. 1, 2011) (finding it
“inappropriate” to decide whether rules of statutory construction required retroactive application of
prospective-only repeal, and “expressly” refusing to do so in writ proceeding). What is clear is that
the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to give retroactive effect to New Mexico’s prospectiveonly repeal in a pending case. Other state supreme courts have done so more explicitly. See, e.g.,
State v. Alcorn, 638 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind. 1994) (holding that prospective-only statute allowing
jury to recommend life imprisonment without possibility of parole rather than death was
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment and not retroactive in the pending case); In re Schneck,
96 P. at 44–45 (holding that prospective-only death penalty repeal was not retroactive in pending
case in which defendant was charged with capital crime three months before repeal).
4. Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Apr. 1, 2013),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year.
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Michael Paul Astorga shot Candido Ray Martinez in the head, killing him.5
Astorga believed that Martinez had stolen his 1959 El Camino, which had
gone missing while Astorga was serving a sentence for various weapons,
vandalism, and drug charges.6 Police issued an arrest warrant for Astorga
but were unable to find him.7 Then, on March 22, 2006, New Mexico
County Deputy Sheriff James McGrane Jr. pulled Astorga over as part of a
routine traffic stop.8 Seconds later, McGrane lay dead—shot in the head by
Astorga.9 Mr. Astorga was eventually located in Mexico where he was
arrested.10 On April 14, 2006, the State of New Mexico charged Astorga
with murdering McGrane and filed notice of its intention to seek the death
penalty, asserting the murder of a police officer as an aggravating factor.11
On March 13, 2009, well before Astorga’s murder trials, New Mexico’s
legislature passed House Bill 285, which repealed the death penalty for
“crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009.”12 The legislature’s rationales
for repeal ranged from the high costs of administering the death penalty
and the prevention of false hope for the families of murder victims, to the
results of a 2008 poll that demonstrated that 64% of New Mexico’s citizens
favored life without parole over the death penalty.13 The legislature’s
reasons for the bill’s prospective-only feature, on the other hand, were far
different. In a “Motion to Dismiss the Death Penalty,” filed with the trial
court on the eve of sentencing, Astorga’s attorney brought the unseemliness
of prospective-only repeal into stark relief:
Legislative debate, according to some involved, on the repeal
5. Maggie Shepard, Family Feud Had Fugitive on the Run, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB. (Mar. 21,
2006, 1:14 PM), http://www.abqtrib.com/news/2006/mar/21/family-feud-had-fugitive-on-the-run;
Olivier Uyttebrouck, Michael Paul Astorga Could Be Spared from Death Penalty in Case of Slain
Deputy, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/584352metro0807-07.htm. Candido Ray Martinez was also known as Candy Ray Martinez. Shepard, supra.
6. Shepard, supra note 5.
7. Uyettebrouck, supra note 5.
8. Scott Sandlin & Olivier Uyttebrouck, Astorga Convicted of Killing Sheriff’s Deputy,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 5, 2010), http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/05235649metro06-0510.htm.
9. Michael Navrot, Astorga’s Passenger Held, Let Go, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Mar. 26, 2006),
http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/445213metro03-26-06.htm.
10. Sandlin & Uyttebrouck, supra note 8.
11. NM’s January 2011 Response, supra note 3, at 1.
12. An Act Relating to Capital Felony Sentencing; Abolishing the Death Penalty; Providing
for Life Imprisonment Without Possibility of Release or Parole, ch. 11, 2009 N.M. Laws 133,
available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/final/HB0285.pdf; 2009 Regular
Session; HB 285; Abolish Death Penalty, N.M. LEGISLATURE, http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/
legislation.aspx?Chamber=H&LegType=B&LegNo=285&year=09 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014)
(noting the date the Senate passed the bill).
13. Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., New Mexico’s Legislature Votes to Abolish
Death Penalty—Part of National Trend Away from Capital Punishment (Mar. 13, 2009),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/NMpressrel.pdf.
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of the death penalty included a compromise, “no repeal for
Michael Astorga.” This appears to be the compromise the
governor and certain legislators requested/demanded in order
to support and/or sign the repeal bill. It appears that
politicians want him to die at the hands of the government
executioner to satisfy the demands of certain law enforcement
and the right-wing pro-death crowd. The last vestige of the
abhorrent death penalty, for politicians and revenge-seekers,
is Michael Astorga’s dead body.14
Governor Bill Richardson, who signed the repeal bill into law on
Wednesday, March 18, 2009, made public statements regarding the bill that
do not contradict this characterization.15 The day after signing the repeal
bill, Richardson told the press he believed Astorga—who had not yet been
14. Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 3.
15. Governor Bill Richardson Signs Repeal of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/governor-bill-richardson-signs-repeal-death-penalty (last
visited Dec. 28, 2013) (quoting in full Governor Richardson’s signing statement). The statements of
Representative Gail Chasey, sponsor of New Mexico’s prospective-only death penalty repeal bill,
on the other hand, do contradict Astorga’s characterization. Interview with Gail Chasey, State
Representative, N.M. House of Representatives (July 11, 2013) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Chasey Interview]. According to Representative Chasey, New Mexico’s death penalty
abolition bill had been prospective-only since she first introduced it 1999—well before Astorga’s
crimes. Id. Although the bill’s prospective-only feature certainly made it easier for lawmakers to
support it, Representative Chasey notes, the decision to make the bill prospective-only had nothing
to do with lawmakers wanting Astorga to get the death penalty. Id. Instead, the decision was based
on, among other things, New Mexico’s constitutional savings clause, which prohibits a new law
from extinguishing penalties, rights, and liabilities under a prior law. N.M. CONST. art. IV, §§ 33–
34; see also id. art. II, § 19 (“No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted by
the legislature”). New Mexico lawmakers interpreted New Mexico’s savings clause to prevent
passage of a retroactive death penalty repeal bill. Chasey Interview, supra; cf. Comment, Today’s
Law and Yesterday’s Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 120, 129 (1972) (“The legislature in [New Mexico] is powerless to lessen penalties for
past transgressions; to do so would require constitutional revision.”). While the New Mexico
legislature’s interpretation of the savings clause is a reasonable one, it is debatable as a matter of
law. For example, the savings clause did not stop the legislature from previously abolishing the
death penalty retroactively, “revo[king] death penalties already imposed and substitut[ing] a
sentence of life imprisonment.” State v. Pace, 456 P.2d 197, 205 (N.M. 1969) (per curiam)
(supplemental opinion) (“It is clear from [the 1969 repeal law] that the legislature intended the act
to apply retroactively.”). It also did not stop the legislature from enacting legislation in 1997 that
explicitly allows the legislature to pass laws that retroactively reduce penalties. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2A-16(c) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 2013 Legis. Sess.) (“If a criminal
penalty for a violation of a statute or rule is reduced by an amendment, the penalty, if not already
imposed, must be imposed under the statute or rule as amended.”); id. § 12-2A-8 (“A statute or rule
operates prospectively only unless the statute or rule expressly provides otherwise . . . .” (emphasis
added)). Therefore, if New Mexico’s legislature had wanted to abolish the death penalty
retroactively for those sentenced to death—at least those whose sentences were not yet final—it
likely could have done so by including an express provision saying as much. For further discussion
of savings clauses, see infra Subsection III.A.1.
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convicted of murder, much less sentenced to death—“should go to the
death penalty. But I think for the future, life in prison without parole is a
huge punishment.”16
Ironically, despite the hue and cry over Astorga, he ultimately was not
sentenced to death.17 Two other men were on New Mexico’s death row
when the repeal bill was signed, and they remain there.18 Although the
governor of New Mexico has the authority to commute death sentences,
their sentences stand.19
As in New Mexico, Connecticut’s path to prospective-only repeal took
place in the shadow of two highly publicized death penalty trials that arose
out of a brutal home invasion and triple murder in the town of Cheshire,
Connecticut.20 In the early morning hours of July 23, 2007, Joshua
Komisarjevsky and Steven Hayes entered the home of the Petit family.21
The men beat and bound Dr. William Petit, then forced his wife, Jennifer
Hawke-Petit, to go to the bank and withdraw $15,000.22 Komisarjevsky
tied the two Petit daughters, eleven-year-old Michaela and seventeen-yearold Hayley, to their beds and sexually assaulted Michaela; Hayes raped
16. Crystal Gutierrez, Gov Subpoenaed in Death-Penalty Case, KRQE (Nov. 23, 2010, 7:13
PM), http://www.krqe.com/news/crime/gov-subpoenaed-in-death-penalty-case (emphasis added).
New Mexico’s gubernatorial candidates also weighed in, both agreeing that New Mexico’s
prospective-only repeal did not apply to Astorga. New Mexico: Death Penalty Becomes Issue in
Gubernatorial Race, DEATH PENALTY NEWS (June 9, 2010), http://deathpenaltynews.blogspot.com/
2010/06/new-mexico-death-penalty-becomes-issue.html.
17. Convicted NM Deputy Killer Avoids Death Penalty, ALAMOGORDO DAILY NEWS (May 18,
2012, 12:24 PM) [hereinafter Deputy Killer], http://www.alamogordonews.com/ci_20655404/nmjurors-death-penalty-case-ask-about-safety. On June 4, 2010, Astorga was convicted of first-degree
murder of McGrane, among other charges. Sandlin & Uyttebrouck, supra note 8. On May 18, 2012,
he was sentenced to life in prison plus thirteen years when a jury failed to unanimously agree on
imposition of the death penalty. Deputy Killer, supra. On January 18, 2012, Astorga was convicted
of second-degree murder of Candido Martinez, among other charges. Astorga Convicted in Second
Murder Trial, KOAT (Jan. 18, 2012, 4:48 AM), http://www.koat.com/Astorga-Convicted-InSecond-Murder-Trial/-/9154444/9708110/-/12hpmd9/-/index.html. On August 3, 2012, he was
sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison for that crime. Hailey Heinz, Astorga Gets 28 More Years,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Aug. 3 2012, 10:45 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/122206/abqnews
seeker/astorga-gets-28-more-years.html.
18. New Mexico, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/newmexico-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
19. LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 250 n.8 (2d ed.
2008); New Mexico, supra note 18.
20. William Glaberson, Reliving Horror in a Test for the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/nyregion/19cheshire.html (“‘All of the things that are
about to play out in the Cheshire case will have a tremendous effect on the death-penalty debate in
this state,’ said State Representative Michael P. Lawlor . . . .”).
21. Manny Fernandez & Alison Leigh Cowan, When Horror Came to a Connecticut Family,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/07/nyregion/07slay.html?
pagewanted=all (corrected Aug. 10, 2007) (reporting the facts of the invasion and subsequent
murders).
22. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6

320

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Jennifer and then strangled her to death.23 The two men then doused the
house in gasoline and ignited it.24 Both Petit girls died from smoke
inhalation.25 Dr. Petit, having regained consciousness, survived by escaping
through a basement door shortly before the gasoline was lit.26 Police
apprehended Komisarjevsky and Hayes as they attempted to flee.27
In 2009, two years after the Cheshire murders, the Connecticut General
Assembly passed a prospective-only bill repealing the death penalty.28 The
addition of the prospective-only feature of the bill, and specifically its
application to Hayes and Komisarjevsky, was the subject of intense debate
in the house and senate.29 When Governor Jodi Rell vetoed the bill on June
5, she was acting in part on the testimony of Dr. Petit, who had argued in
support of the death penalty.30
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. An Act Concerning the Penalty for a Capital Felony, H.R. 6578, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (Conn. 2009), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/act/Pa/pdf/2009PA-00107-R00HB06578-PA.PDF (vetoed June 5, 2009). H.R. 6578 passed the House by a vote of 90-56 and the
Senate by a vote of 19-17. Death Penalty in Connecticut, CONN. NETWORK TO ABOLISH DEATH
PENALTY, http://www.cnadp.org/resources/death-penalty-in-connecticut/ (updated Nov. 15, 2010).
Two years before the Cheshire murders, in 2005, the Connecticut General Assembly attempted to
pass a bill that would have repealed the death penalty both prospectively and retroactively. An Act
Concerning Murder with Special Circumstances, H.R. 6012, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn.
2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/TOB/h/pdf/2005HB-06012-R02-HB.pdf; see also
Death Penalty in Connecticut, supra. The backdrop to that legislation, and no small reason for its
demise, was the then-pending, widely publicized execution of serial killer Michael Ross (which
eventually occurred on May 13, 2005). See LAWRENCE B. GOODHEART, THE SOLEMN SENTENCE OF
DEATH: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT 243 (2011). Because “[a] move to strike the death
penalty would not only effectively commute the death sentences of six inmates, but also of Ross, to
life in prison,” Democrats worried about being the target of “attack campaign[s] . . . with the
message: Did your legislator vote to spare Michael Ross?” Id.; see also H. Sess. Transcript for Apr.
11, 2012, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2012), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/trn/H/2012HTR00411-R00TRN.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) [hereinafter 2012 H. Sess. Transcript] (statement of Rep.
Larry Cafero, H. Minority Leader) (stating that 2005 debate “was all about Michael Ross, . . . the
poster boy for the death penalty . . . who was reviled as one of the most heinous villains of our time
in our State’s history”). That was the last time Connecticut’s General Assembly attempted to pass a
retroactive repeal.
29. See, e.g., S. Sess. Transcript for May 21, 2009, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2009)
http://search.cga.state.ct.us/dtsearch_lpa.asp?cmd=getdoc&DocId=33324&Index=I%3A%5Czindex
%5C2009 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (statement of Sen. McDonald in opposition to an amendment
excluding from repeal murder in the course of a home invasion) (“I think it would be a mistake to
leave the impression that somehow anything in the underlying bill would affect the prosecution of
the two defendants in the Petit case.”); see also Amendment to H.R. 6578: An Act Concerning the
Penalty for a Capital Felony, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/AMD/H/2009HB-06578-R00SA-AMD.htm (excluding murder in the
course of a home invasion).
30. See Press Release, State of Conn. Exec. Chambers, Governor Rell Vetoes HB 6578, An
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When the state assembly next attempted to repeal the death penalty in
2011, it did so in the wake of Stephen Hayes’s capital murder trial and
sentencing, and on the eve of Joshua Komisarjevsky’s trial.31 The Cheshire
murders weighed so heavily on the minds of some legislators that the
murders single-handedly derailed an effort to pass even a prospective-only
bill.32 After a personal visit from Dr. Petit, two state senators changed their
position “out of sympathy” for him, and the 2011 prospective-only repeal
failed.33 One of those senators, Edith Prague, told the press that “[t]hey
should bypass the trial and take that second animal and hang him by his
penis from a tree out in the middle of Main Street.”34
In 2012, a prospective-only repeal bill was considered for the third
time. The Cheshire murders were at the center of debate in the House and
Act Concerning the Penalty for a Capital Felony (June 5, 2009), http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/
cwp/view.asp?A=3675&Q=441204 (reciting Dr. Petit’s quotation of Lord Justice Denning, Master
of the Rolls of the Court of Appeals in the United Kingdom). The United Kingdom abolished its
death penalty for murder in 1965 and did so both prospectively and retroactively. See Murder
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c. 71 (Eng.), available at http://www.legisla
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/1965/71.
31. Hayes was convicted of capital murder on October 5, 2010 and sentenced to death on
November 8, 2010. William Glaberson, Death Penalty for a Killer of 3 in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/nyregion/09cheshire.html. Komisarjevsky was
convicted of capital murder on October 13, 2011 and sentenced to death on December 9, 2011.
William Glaberson, Death Penalty for 2nd Man in Connecticut Triple-Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/nyregion/joshua-komisarjevsky-gets-death-forcheshire-killings.html.
32. See An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies, S. 1035, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (Conn. 2011), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/TOB/S/2011SB-01035-R01-SB.htm.
33. See State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566, 696 (Conn. 2012) (Harper, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Because Josh Komisarjevsky had not yet been convicted of the 2007 crimes, Dr.
Petit argued that passage of a prospective-only repeal “could complicate [his] capital trial.” Mark
Pazniokas, At Petit’s Request, Two Senators Stop Repeal of Death Penalty, CT MIRROR (May 11,
2011), http://www.ctmirror.org/story/12559/petits-request-prague-stop-repeal-death-penalty-year.
As Senator Edith Prague later told legislators:
I did have a meeting with Dr. Petit and his sister and their attorney. And the
attorney said if you vote for repeal now, it’s going to be next to impossible for us
to get the death penalty for these two monsters who were involved in the slaughter
of the Petit family. And out of respect for Dr. Petit, I said . . . I could not vote for
repeal. I couldn’t because certainly Dr. Petit had suffered enough and I wasn’t
about to cause anymore [sic] problems.
S. Sess. Transcript for Apr. 4, 2012, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2012), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/trn/S/
2012STR00404-R00-TRN.htm [hereinafter 2012 S. Sess. Transcript] (statement of Sen. Edith
Prague); see also Pazniokas, supra (“For Dr. Petit, for me to do one more thing to cause him some
kind of angst, I can’t do it. . . . I’m [refusing to vote for repeal] because that’s what they came in
for . . . . ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sen. Edith Prague)).
34. Santiago, 49 A.3d at 696 (Harper, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Bob Connors, Prague: “Hang the Animal By His . . . .,” NBC CONN. (May 12, 2011),
http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Prague-Hang-the-Animal-by-His-121670559.html.
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the Senate.35 With assurances that the bill was prospective-only,36 the
Assembly passed a repeal of the death penalty for “crimes committed on or
after” the date of passage, and Governor Dannel Malloy signed the bill into
law on April 25, 2012.37 Connecticut’s eleven death row inmates38 remain
on death row; only the Board of Pardons and Paroles has the authority to
commute their sentences, which it has not done.39
35. Compare 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28 (statement of Rep. Cafero) (“It is no
secret that what is weighing over all of us is the Petit murders. We heard through the summer and
spring, the fall of 2010 and 2011 of these horrible, heinous, deplorable crimes. People in the jury
box vomited for the pictures they saw and the descriptions they heard. . . . [Those voting for
prospective repeal] want to see justice by way of the death penalty happen for those in the Petit
case . . . . [I]t’s because of [Komisarjevsky and Hayes] that we have the bill that we have before
us.”), id. (statement of Rep. Hewett) (acknowledging “members who are voting for a prospective
bill so they can make sure that Hayes and Komisarjevsky get the death penalty”), and id. (statement
of Rep. Adinolfi) (“There are many people in this room that have changed in their mind their vote
to abolish the death penalty [prospectively] rather than vote against abolishing the death penalty
based on these 11 who are on death row being executed, especially, Komisarjevsky and
Hayes . . . .”), with 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Boucher) (“[T]he
crimes that affected the Petit family . . . [are] behind the whole rationale for making this
prospective.”), and id. (statement of Sen. Kissel) (“Mr. Hayes and Mr. Komisarjevsky . . . had
multiple capital convictions. And that is why it’s almost impossible to get a bill through this
Legislature right now that would repeal the death penalty across the board.”).
36. See, e.g., 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Coleman, responding
to question from Sen. Prague) (“[T]here will be no retroactive application of this change for anyone
who’s currently on death row.”).
37. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (citing repeal statute); Daniela Altimari, Without
Fanfare, Malloy Signs Bill Abolishing Death Penalty, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://articles.courant.com/2012-04-25/news/hc-death-penalty-signing-0426-20120425_1_deathpenalty-gail-canzano-capital-punishment.
38. Shortly after Connecticut’s repeal became law, the Connecticut Supreme Court
overturned the death sentence of Eduardo Santiago, one of Connecticut’s eleven death row
prisoners, on grounds that the trial court had improperly failed to disclose privileged records
regarding abuse and neglect of Mr. Santiago’s siblings. State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d at 566, 653–54
(Conn. 2012). The Connecticut Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new
penalty phase hearing, id., but Mr. Santiago argued that Connecticut’s prospective-only repeal
prohibited the state from seeking the death penalty against him. Supplemental Brief of Defendant,
State v. Santiago, S.C. 17413, at 1–3 (Conn. Nov. 13, 2012). Mr. Santiago’s case is once again
pending before the Connecticut Supreme Court. Because Mr. Santiago remains subject to the death
penalty at the time of this writing (albeit not sentenced to death), this Article includes him within
Connecticut’s death row population as a statistical matter. Connecticut Supreme Court Considers
Executions
After
Death
Penalty
Repeal,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/connecticut-supreme-court-considers-executions-after-death-penal
ty-repeal (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
39. CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 250 n.9; Connecticut, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/connecticut-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). Even if Governor
Malloy had the authority to commute the sentences of those on Connecticut’s death row, it is
unlikely that he would do so. In a gubernatorial debate in October 2010, Malloy stated that “he
would abolish the death penalty only in future cases—not in those currently underway,” and singled
out the two defendants in the Cheshire murders, stating that “[i]f these two gentlemen are sentenced
to death, that sentence will be carried out. Period.” Christopher Keating, Tom Foley, Dan Malloy
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Like New Mexico and Connecticut, Maryland’s decision to repeal the
death penalty prospective-only was motivated in part by political concerns.
Between 2001 and 2008, Maryland’s legislature introduced death penalty
repeal bills nearly every year. 40 All were explicitly retroactive, and none
ever made it to a floor vote. 41
In 2008, the legislature passed a law creating the Maryland Commission
on Capital Punishment, a 23-person body tasked with studying the
administration of the death penalty, holding public hearings, and issuing a
report with recommendations to the legislature by the end of the year.42 At
the Commission’s hearings, several family members of murder victims
testified in support of the death penalty. One of those family members was
Phyllis Bricker, whose elderly parents were “bound, gagged, and
repeatedly stabbed to death in their Baltimore home” in 1983 by a neighbor
who wanted money for drugs.43 Ms. Bricker testified that she had waited
for “equal justice” for over twenty-five years, “attending every trial, appeal,
and hearing,” including five trips to the U.S. Supreme Court.44 In her
testimony in support of the death penalty, Sharon Ward Blickenstaff
likewise described in intimate detail the fatal stabbing of her blind, elderly
father in his home in 2002.45 “[T]he murder[er]’s victims are put into a
situation where their cries of pain and pleas for mercy fall on uncaring
ears,” Ms. Blickenstaff wrote.46 “Who stands for the true victims? Who
gives them a voice? Who cares for the families of survivors?”47 And
Harold Bernadzikowski, whose sister was murdered in 2000, testified
about the “debilitating stress” and depression that survivors experience,
and encouraged members of the Commission to “put victim’s [sic] rights
Clash On Death Penalty, Jobs, Records In Gubernatorial Debate, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 6,
2010), http://articles.courant.com/2010-10-06/news/hc-gubernatorial-debate-1006-20101005_
1_death-penalty-foley-malloy-democrat-dannel-malloy (emphasis added).
40. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS. OF MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE: HB 316,
2009 Sess., at 9, available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2009rs/fnotes/bil_0006/hb0316.pdf
(discussing legislative history of Maryland death penalty repeal bills from 2001 to 2008). It appears
2002 was the only year in which a death penalty repeal bill was not introduced. See id.
41. Id.
42. Commission members “included police officers, correctional officers, family members of
murder victims, prosecutors and defense attorneys, an innocent Maryland man sentenced to death
who was later exonerated, and other members of Maryland’s community.” Maryland Commission
Recommends Abolition of Death Penalty in Final Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/maryland-commission-recommends-abolition-death-penalty-finalreport.
43. Transcript for Aug. 5, 2008, Md. Comm’n. on Capital Punishment, at 7 (Md. 2008),
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/transcript-aug-5.doc.
44. Id. at 8, 11.
45. Testimony of Sharon Ward Blickenstaff, Md. Comm’n on Capital Punishment, at 3-4
(Md. Aug. 27 2008), http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/blickenstafftestimony.pdf.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id. at 7.
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first.”48
On December 12, 2008, the Commission issued a report calling for
repeal of the death penalty.49 One month later, in January 2009, the
Maryland legislature introduced Maryland’s first prospective-only death
penalty repeal bill.50 That bill deleted the retroactive language found in
prior bills, which stated that “an inmate who has been sentenced to death
before the effective date of this Act and who has not been executed may
not be executed and shall be considered as having received a sentence of
life.”51
With the strong support of Governor Martin O’Malley, the bill passed in
2013 and took effect on October 1, 2013.52 Officials involved in the effort
to abolish Maryland’s death penalty attribute the success of the bill, in part,
to its prospective-only feature.53 Maryland’s five death row inmates remain
48. Testimony of Harold Bernadzikowski, Md. Comm’n on Capital Punishment, at 1, 5 (Md.
Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/bernadzikowskitestimony.pdf. Support for the death penalty was not shared among all family members of murder
victims. “Bonnita Spikes, whose husband was murdered, Lisa Delity, whose brother was murdered,
Ginger Beale, whose son was murdered, Art Laffin, whose brother was murdered, Kim Armstrong,
whose son was murdered and Erricka Bridgeford, whose brother was murdered, favor repeal of the
death penalty.” Final Report to the Gen. Assemb., Md. Comm’n on Capital Punishment, at 55 (Md.
Dec. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Final Report], http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capitalpunishment/documents/death-penalty-commission-final-report.pdf.
49. Final Report, supra note 48.
50. See An Act Concerning Criminal Law – Death Penalty – Repeal, HB 316, 2009 Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2009) (deleting retroactivity provision); An Act Concerning Criminal Law – Death
Penalty – Evidence, S.B. 279, ch. 186, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009).
51. Compare An Act Concerning Criminal Law – Death Penalty – Repeal, HB 1328,2008
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008) (“BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, [t]hat an inmate who has been sentenced to
death before the effective date of this Act and who has not been executed may not be executed and
shall be considered as having received a sentence of life . . . .”), with An Act Concerning Criminal
Law – Death Penalty – Repeal, H.B. 316, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009) (deleting retroactivity
provision), and An Act Concerning Criminal Law – Death Penalty – Repeal, S.B. 279, 2009 Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2009) (same).
52. S.B. 276. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); see also What Made Maryland Different?, NAT’L
COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/blog/entry/what-mademaryland-different.
53. Telephone Interview (Aug. 9, 2013) (source confidential at request of interviewee; notes
on file with author). Like New Mexico, Maryland’s legislature also appears to have been motivated
by a legal determination that reducing the sentences of those currently on death row would create a
“constitutional separation of powers problem.” Email from Jane Henderson, Exec. Dir., Md.
Citizens Against State Executions (July 16, 2013) (on file with author). Lawmakers apparently
believed that they did “not have the power to sentence any individual to anything,” so, in 2009, they
removed the bill’s explicitly retroactive language. Id. Although the Maryland legislature’s
interpretation of the law is reasonable, it is debatable as a matter of law. For example, Maryland’s
general savings statute explicitly allows the legislature to pass laws that retroactively reduce
penalties. See MD. CODE ANN., art. 1, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (preserving
penalties under repealed statutes “unless the repealing . . . act shall expressly so provide”).
Furthermore, Maryland’s constitutional prohibition on “retrospective Laws, punishing acts
committed before the existence of such Laws,” and “retrospective oath[s] or restriction[s],” by its
terms, prohibits retroactive legislation that burdens, not benefits. MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration
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on death row; Governor O’Malley has stated that he “would consider
commuting the five inmates’ sentences to life in prison on a case-by-case
basis once a request is made.”54
New Mexico’s, Connecticut’s, and Maryland’s experience with
prospective-only repeal gives rise to three important questions. The first is
a pragmatic question: Is prospective-only repeal helpful to the cause of
abolition? The second is a moral question: Is prospective-only repeal
morally right? And the third question is a legal one: Is prospective-only
repeal permissible under the law? This Article answers all three questions
in the affirmative.
Part I of this Article addresses the pragmatic question. It concludes that
prospective-only repeal, with its promise of gradual abolition, is useful to
the cause of abolition. States have long used prospective-only repeal to
abolish the death penalty. In the past five years, all that has changed is that
three states have not commuted the sentences of those on death row
following prospective-only repeal. Connecticut, New Mexico, and
Maryland have left their death rows intact after abolishing the death
penalty for everyone else.55 While abolition’s principles may be at odds
with prospective-only repeal, abolition’s progress may not be. The states
next in line for abolition have inmates on death row, which makes
prospective-only repeal an enticing option for some lawmakers. If states’
high courts or lower federal courts strike down prospective-only repeals,
abolition may lose a trusty and useful tool.
While this Article cannot do justice to the weighty moral questions
raised by prospective-only repeal, Part II offers some introductory thoughts
on how prospective-only repeal, when viewed through the lens of sacrifice,
may actually be moral. While it may be immoral to punish a person with
death, it is not necessarily immoral to sacrifice them for the higher good of
eliminating the death penalty forever. Many of Connecticut’s, New
Mexico’s, and Maryland’s lawmakers voted for prospective-only repeal
because they knew that a retroactive bill would not be passed. Rather than
maintain the death penalty for all, these lawmakers voted for a bill that
would maintain it for only some, thus transforming an immoral punishment
into an arguably moral sacrifice. In dying, these convicted men destroy the
death penalty.
Part III, the heart of this Article, analyzes the legality of prospectiveonly repeal, both as a matter of statutory construction and as a
constitutional question under the Eighth Amendment. Because this issue is
of Rights, art. 17. Therefore, if Maryland’s legislature had wanted to abolish the death penalty
retroactively for those sentenced to death, it likely could have done so by including an express
provision saying as much. For further discussion of savings clauses, see infra Subsection III.A.1.
54. Brian White, Maryland Governor Slow to Commute Death Sentences, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 13, 2013, 11:54 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/md-governor-slow-commute-deathsentences.
55. See Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4.
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currently before the Connecticut Supreme Court and will undoubtedly
come before other state supreme and federal courts, this Article discusses
the issue in depth. A companion article, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The
Fourteenth Amendment Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty,
addresses the legality of prospective-only repeal under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.56
This Article first argues that, as a matter of statutory construction,
clearly prospective-only repeals of death penalty legislation are not given
retroactive effect. When such repeals are silent or ambiguous as to whether
they are prospective-only, most courts still construe them as being
prospective-only by resorting to general savings statutes, which prohibit
retroactive application of laws in the absence of contrary legislative intent.
Next, this Article argues that prospective-only repeal is constitutional
under the Eighth Amendment. Because the death penalty remains
constitutional per se, the Eighth Amendment permits states to abolish the
death penalty without clearing their death rows. Prospective-only repeal is
also constitutional under the Eighth Amendment as applied. Under Atkins
v. Virginia57 and its progeny, there is no national consensus against
prospective-only repeal. The vast majority of legislatures have abolished
prospective-only. Although some executives have commuted the sentences
of those remaining on death row post-repeal, others have not. There simply
is no national consensus against prospective-only repeal. Furthermore,
those remaining on death row post-repeal share no unifying characteristic
that diminishes their culpability or susceptibility to deterrence. Lastly,
under Furman, the death sentences at issue are not “pregnant with
discrimination”; they were imposed under a constitutional scheme and
remain constitutional post-repeal.
Prospective-only repeal is also consistent with policy considerations
underlying the Eighth Amendment. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
has expressed reluctance to expand the death penalty. On the other hand,
the Court’s dissenters have argued that the Court’s Eighth Amendment
inquiry into evolving standards of decency is not a “ratchet” that forbids
states from evolving in other directions—“giving effect to altered beliefs
and responding to changed social conditions.”58 Prospective-only repeal
does not upset either concern: it does not loosen the screw one iota, rather
it allows states to turn the screw at their own pace. The effect of a ruling
that prospective-only repeals are unconstitutional would be to require that
states not only use a ratchet—in the sense that the screw must turn toward
abolition, not away, but also ratchet with a zeal that outpaces the
56. See Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra note 1.
57. 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002).
58. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 466 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991) (Scalia, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
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ratcheter—in the sense that the screw must turn toward prospective and
retroactive abolition. If prospective-only repeal is ruled prospective in
name only, some states may decide not to abolish the death penalty at all,
thereby fossilizing their standard of decency rather than allowing it to
evolve.
I. THE UTILITY OF PROSPECTIVE-ONLY REPEAL
A. Prospective-Only Repeal’s Long History
Prospective-only death penalty repeal is helpful to the cause of
abolition. To understand why this is so, one need only look at the sixteen
states that have abolished their death penalties by statute.59 With just three
exceptions, every one of those states did so prospective-only, albeit not as
explicitly as New Mexico, Connecticut, or Maryland.60 Prospective-only
repeal is therefore not novel; it has been an effective tool of the abolition
movement for over a hundred years.61 What is novel, however—at least in
modern death penalty jurisprudence—is the refusal of governors and
administrative boards to commute sentences in anticipation of, or
immediately following, prospective-only repeal.62
In the past five years, for example, four states have repealed their death
penalties and all have done so through prospective-only legislation. In
2011, the governor of Illinois commuted the sentences of those on death
row immediately after repeal so the death penalty was effectively abolished
completely.63 By contrast, in Maryland, where the death penalty was
59. Eighteen states plus the District of Columbia have abolished the death penalty. States
With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). Of
those, Massachusetts, New York, and the District of Columbia have abolished their death penalties
by court decision and legislative inaction. See Massachusetts, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/massachusetts-0 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014); New York, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-york-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014);
District of Columbia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/districtcolumbia (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
60. See supra notes 2–3 (discussing New Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland); infra
Subsection III.B.2.a.i (discussing three explicitly retroactive state statutes and three explicitly
prospective-only state statutes, and arguing that the other ten state statutes are prospective-only); cf.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 n.1, 342–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing prospective-only statutes
prohibiting execution of people with intellectual disabilities).
61. See In re Schneck, 96 P. 43, 44–45 (Kan. 1908) (holding that prospective-only death
penalty repeal was not retroactive); accord State v. Lewis, 201 S.W. 80, 85–86 (Mo. 1918);
Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 4 n.11 (noting that in Minnesota, which repealed its death penalty
in 1911, Board of Pardons commuted death sentences of remaining death-row inmates, which
would only have been necessary if the repeal was prospective-only).
62. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
63. An Act Concerning Criminal Law, Pub. Act 96-1543, 2010 Ill. Laws 7778 (2011),
available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/96/PDF/096-1543.pdf; Illinois, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/illinois-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
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abolished with a prospective-only act in 2013, five men remain on death
row because the governor is unwilling to commute their sentences.64
Likewise, the governor of New Mexico has been unwilling to commute the
sentences of two inmates on death row after that state’s legislature
abolished the death penalty by a prospective-only act in 2009.65 In
Connecticut, where the death penalty was abolished with a prospectiveonly act in 2012, eleven men remain on death row because the
administrative board with the authority to commute their sentences has not
done so.66 Kansas and Delaware are poised to become the nineteenth and
twentieth states to abolish the death penalty. They will likely do so with
prospective-only legislation; prospective-only death penalty repeal bills are
pending in both states’ legislatures.67 If the Kansas legislature passes a
prospective-only repeal, it will be up to the governor to decide whether to
commute the sentences of Kansas’ ten death row prisoners or add those
prisoners to the roll of inmates who remain on death row post-repeal.68 If
the Delaware legislature passes a prospective-only repeal, an
administrative board will decide whether to recommend commutation to
the governor of the sentences of that state’s eighteen death row inmates;
the governor is bound by that recommendation.69
It is clear from these examples that prospective-only death penalty
64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Compare Press Release, The Office of Governor
Martin O’Malley, Statement from Governor Martin O’Malley on Passage of Death Penalty Repeal
in Maryland (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.governor.maryland.gov/blog/?p=8492
(noting that the governor will make case-by-case determinations for the five inmates on death row),
with Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4 (noting that there remain five inmates on death
row).
65. See text accompanying notes 18–19.
66. See supra notes 2, 37–39 and accompanying text.
67. E.g., S. 239, 2013 Leg., 2013 Sess. (Kan. 2013), http://kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/
measures/documents/sb126_00_0000.pdf (“(a) No person shall be sentenced to death for a crime
committed on or after July 1, 2013. (b) Any person who is sentenced to death for a crime committed
prior to July 1, 2013, may be put to death pursuant to the provisions of article 40 of chapter 22 of
the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto.”); An Act to Amend Title 11 of the
Delaware Code Relating to the Death Penalty, S. 19, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013),
http://www.legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS147.NSF/vwLegislation/SB+19?Opendocument. Senate
Amendment No. 1 modified the bill as originally proposed, removing the retroactive provision,
making the bill prospective-only. S. Amendment 1 to S. 19, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013),
http://www.legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis147.nsf/vwLegislation/SA+1+to+SB+19?opendocument;
Senate Amendment No: 1 to Senate Bill No. 19, DELAWARE.GOV, http://www.legis.delaware.gov/
LIS/lis147.nsf/vwLegislation/SA+1+to+SB+19?opendocument (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (noting
passage of the amendment).
68. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 250 n.8 (stating that, in Kansas, “the governor has
sole authority to grant clemency”); Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4 (noting ten death row
inmates in Kansas).
69. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 251 n.11 (stating that, in Delaware, “the governor
may grant clemency only after a recommendation by an administrative board”); Death Row Inmates
by State, supra note 4 (noting eighteen death row inmates in Delaware).
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repeal has momentum in states whose legislatures would rather leave the
difficult decision of what to do about current death row inmates to the
governor or pardon board. It also has momentum in states where the
governor will not sign a repeal bill into law unless it is prospective-only.
Given its enduring success, especially in recent years, prospective-only
repeal is likely to be an attractive option for future states considering
abolition, including: Colorado (with four inmates on death row); Kentucky
(thirty-four on death row); Montana (two on death row); Nebraska (eleven
on death row); New Hampshire (one on death row); Pennsylvania (a
staggering 198 on death row); and South Dakota (three on death row).70 In
Nebraska and Pennsylvania, the governor does not have the unilateral
authority to commute death sentences after prospective-only repeal.71 In
the remaining states from the list above—where the governor retains the
authority to commute death sentences72—political pressure or other
considerations may prevent the governor from doing so, as happened in
New Mexico and Maryland. The past seven years have brought six states to
the abolitionist camp.73 Odds are good that the next seven years will bring
more, and that some will choose to keep their death rows intact.
B. Prospective-Only Repeal’s Uncertain Future
In 2014, in State v. Santiago, the Connecticut Supreme Court will
decide the issue of whether a state can completely abolish its death penalty
going forward while maintaining its death row intact.74 If the court
70. Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4. Significantly, California’s 2012 ballot
proposition abolishing the death penalty was both prospective and retroactive. SAFE California
Act, § 10, 2012 Cal. Leg. Serv. Proposition 34, at 95, 100, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/
2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop34 (“In order to best achieve the
purpose of this act as stated in Section 3 and to achieve fairness, equality and uniformity in
sentencing, this act shall be applied retroactively.”). Proposition 34 narrowly missed passing by a
vote of 48.0% to 52.0%. Directory of California State Propositions, SMART VOTER (Dec. 17, 2012,
13:48), http://www.smartvoter.org/2012/11/06/ca/state/prop. Had it passed, Proposition 34 would
have reduced the sentences of California’s then-725 death row prisoners to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. Prop 34. Death Penalty. Initiative Statute., CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE:
OFFICIAL VOTER INFO. GUIDE, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/34/analysis.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014).
PENALTY
INFO.
CENTER,
71. Clemency
Process
by
State,
DEATH
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency#process (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
72. Id. In some states, the governor may receive a nonbinding recommendation from a board
or advisory group. Id.
73. These states are New York (2007), New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), Illinois
(2011), Connecticut (2012), and Maryland (2013). States With and Without the Death Penalty,
supra note 59.
74. See Brief Amicus Curiae for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Conn. at i.,
State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566 (Conn. Feb. 11, 2013) (No. SC17413), available at
http://www.cjlf.org/briefs/SantiagoE.pdf (question presented); see also supra note 3 (discussing
the New Mexico Supreme Court’s experience with prospective-only death penalty repeal in State v.
Astorga).
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challenge is successful, it will be a coup for the defendant in that case and
possibly for Connecticut’s ten other death row inmates, whose sentences
might therefore be reduced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. It would also create strong persuasive precedent for the seven men
who remain on death row in Maryland and New Mexico to use in similar
appeals.
While abolitionists would no doubt warmly receive these ripple effects,
there could be other less desirable effects. Reverberations from the court’s
ruling would be felt, not only on death row but also in the legislature,
particularly among abolition’s foes. If these opponents challenged
abolitionists on the legal merits of prospective-only repeal, as they did in
Connecticut,75 abolitionists may have little to say beyond, “Connecticut’s
court got it wrong.” Legislatures might therefore be less willing to pass
prospective-only repeals, and governors might be less likely to sign them,
if these repeals become “prospective” in name only.76 A federal court
decision striking down prospective-only repeal would have a similar
impact, in effect requiring that states repeal retroactively or not at all.77 In
short, while the invalidation of prospective-only death penalty repeal
would be good for at least some of the eighteen inmates currently on death
row post-repeal, it may be bad for the abolition movement.78 It may
75. See 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28 (statement of Rep. Labriola) (“To the notion
that somehow this bill will be prospective in nature, I do believe that that is a complete and utter
falsehood. . . . [B]y operation of law the people who are now sentenced to death on our death row in
Connecticut, their death penalties will be commuted to life in prison without parole, without
question. It’s—it’s a certainty.”); id. (statement of Rep. Hewett) (“[F]or the members who are
voting for a prospective bill so they can make sure that Hayes and Komisarjevsky get the death
penalty, it’s not going to happen.”); 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen.
Kissel) (“[I]f matters of life and death come before a Supreme Court and a prospective repeal of the
death penalty is the law of the land in our state, I really can’t imagine for a second that they would
allow the execution of the 11 folks on death row while acknowledging that under any legal analysis,
this law is the best and most recent indication of evolving standards in our society of human
decency.”).
76. Cf. Millard H. Ruud, The Savings Clause: Some Problems in Construction and Drafting,
33 TEX. L. REV. 285, 286, 310 (1955) (stating that statutory language that leaves in place existing
penalties “make[s] the transition from one set of laws to another less painful and disrupting” and
“may be used to create a favorable climate for a bill by assuring legislators that the change proposed
will take effect with the minimum disruption of existing expectations and liabilities”).
77. Cf. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (stating
that, in the context of state parole legislation, “[o]ur system of federalism encourages . . . state
experimentation. If parole determinations are encumbered by procedures that states regard as
burdensome and unwarranted, they may abandon or curtail parole.”).
78. Courts’ rejection of prospective-only repeal might be bad for the abolition movement for
another reason. If a court were to declare prospective-only language unconstitutional, the court may
decide that such language is not severable from the remainder of the repeal statute. In that case, “the
only remedy available to th[e] Court is to strike down the entire statute, which would have the effect
of reinstating the [death penalty].” NM’s January 2011 Response, supra note 3, at 32; see also
Supplemental Brief of the State of Conn.—Appellee at 41, State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566 (Conn.
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undermine a strategy that has worked well in recent years—that of gradual
abolition.
Some abolitionists might say good riddance to the strategy of gradual
abolition, pointing to its cost in human lives. It is not enough that no more
should die; none should die. But this purist position assumes that those on
death row will be executed. The reality is, in many cases, those on death
row will not be executed. They will challenge their sentences, and continue
challenging them, until either they die of old age, or the Supreme Court
declares the death penalty unconstitutional per se. In sum, gradual abolition
may be a win-win: lawmakers retain their death rows and (many of) those
on death row retain their lives.
Others might argue that prospective-only repeal will ultimately
backfire. When it comes time for the U.S. Supreme Court to revisit the
question of whether there is a national consensus against the death penalty,
the argument goes, it will discount those states that have abolished the
death penalty prospective-only. In other words, states like New Mexico,
Connecticut, and Maryland will not be counted as having abolished the
death penalty. The response to this concern is straightforward: the Court’s
precedent suggests otherwise.79 Although the Court’s dissenters care
whether the death penalty repeal is prospective-only or complete, the
majority does not.
In Atkins, for example, the Court determined that a consensus of states
objected to the execution of people with intellectual disabilities,
notwithstanding the fact that eleven of the states that abolished the death
penalty for people with intellectual disabilities did so prospective-only.80
Although Justice Scalia believed that prospective-only repeal was far
different than complete repeal because it prohibited some but not all
executions, the majority did not share his concerns.81 As Atkins makes
clear, consensus has to do with whether a state abolishes, not how. States
Jan. 11, 2013) (No. SC17413) [hereinafter CT’s January 2013 Response] (“[I]f this Court strikes
[the death penalty repeal statute] in its entirety, [the prior statute] would be revived, thereby
restoring capital punishment as it existed before the passage of the [repeal statute].”).
79. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–15 (2002).
80. See id. at 315–16 (discussing the “large number of States prohibiting the execution of
mentally retarded persons”).
81. Compare id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Eleven of those [states] that the Court counts
enacted statutes prohibiting execution of mentally retarded defendants convicted after, or convicted
of crimes committed after, the effective date of the legislation; those already on death row, or
consigned there before the statute’s effective date, or even (in those States using the date of the
crime as the criterion of retroactivity) tried in the future for murders committed many years ago,
could be put to death. That is not a statement of absolute moral repugnance, but one of current
preference between two tolerable approaches.” (footnote omitted)), with id. at 315 (majority
opinion) (compiling state statutes prohibiting death penalty for “mentally retarded”), and Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005) (“When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death
penalty for the mentally retarded. This number comprised 12 that had abandoned the death penalty
altogether, and 18 that maintained it but excluded the mentally retarded from its reach.”).
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that have repealed prospective-only are not at odds with those that have
repealed prospectively and retroactively; they are two sides of the same
coin, sharing an underlying opposition to the death penalty. States with
prospective-only repeal statutes are evolving, one might say. For a variety
of moral and pragmatic reasons, however, they are just evolving more
slowly. So far as the Court is concerned, though, prospective-only repeal is
still repeal; it is part of the evolution away from the death penalty.82
II. THE MORALITY OF PROSPECTIVE-ONLY REPEAL
Even assuming that prospective-only repeal is helpful to abolition’s
cause, one might reasonably ask how it is moral. How is it right for New
Mexico’s, Connecticut’s, and Maryland’s legislatures to leave eighteen men
convicted of murder on day one on death row, while eliminating the death
penalty for those who commit murder on day two?83 While it is not the
purpose of this Article to plumb the depths of this difficult issue, some
introductory thoughts are instructive.
The moral debate over the death penalty is straightforward. Death
penalty abolitionists believe that the death penalty is an immoral form of
punishment, while those in favor of retaining the death penalty take the
opposite position.84 When debate focuses on prospective-only repeal of the
death penalty, however, the debate gets trickier. Dr. Martin Luther King
Jr.’s words, which he wrote from a jail cell in Birmingham, are illustrative
of this debate: “[T]he means we use must be as pure as the ends we
seek . . . . [I]t is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends.”85
Abolitionists grudgingly accept maintaining the death penalty for those on
death row as a necessary evil, a side effect of achieving the greater good—
abolition going forward.86 Prospective-only repeal is undesirable, these
82. See id. at 315 (majority opinion). As Justice Scalia wrote of the Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence, “It is just a game, after all.” Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He may be right. But it
is a game with the highest stakes, one abolitionists must play—and win. Prospective-only repeal
helps.
83. See, e.g., 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28 (statement of Rep. Cafero) (“How could
we say it is no longer the policy of the State of Connecticut to take a life, yet, we are allowing a life
to be taken? So it’s in conflict.”).
84. See generally CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 8–13 (discussing debate over deterrence
and retribution in the context of the death penalty).
85. Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available at
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
86. 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28 (statement of Rep. Holder-Winfield) (“[T]here is
nothing wrong with being opposed to the State executing people and saying if I can’t get the State
to stop executing people that are already on death row, at least, that I can stop the State from
executing people that maybe [sic] on death row in the future. There’s nothing wrong with that. It
makes perfect sense. It’s logical. What is illogical is to say to a person who is opposed to the death
penalty, you have the chance to stop the State from moving forward, but because you can’t stop the
State from dealing with those who it has already put through its system, you do nothing.”); see also
Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (last updated Sept. 7,
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abolitionists say, but not immoral. For retentionists, this position is
disingenuous. Reserving the death penalty for those currently on death row,
retentionists say, is not a mere side effect; it is an immoral means of
achieving (what abolitionists believe to be) a moral end.87 According to
retentionists, if the death penalty is immoral, then retaining it through
prospective-only repeal is also immoral.
As Dr. King’s words suggest, the moral debate over prospective-only
repeal sets undesirable side effects against immoral means. But peace can
be made between these two sides. Prospective-only repeal is a means, and
it is also a moral one.
The death penalty is, as its name suggests, a form of punishment. It is a
means by which the State condemns the acts of the offender—retribution—
and discourages others from committing similar acts in the future—
deterrence. Through punishment, the State restores balance to the
community by making up for what the offender has taken away.88 In the
context of prospective-only repeal, however, the death penalty is not only a
means of punishment; it is also a means of ending a punishment. It is not
just a means of restoring what the community has lost. Rather, it also
becomes a means of making the community better than it was before. In
Connecticut, for example, many legislators wanted to repeal the death
penalty completely, but they knew that this was not politically feasible.
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect (“The doctrine (or principle) of double effect
is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the
death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end. It is claimed that sometimes it
is permissible to cause such a harm as a side effect (or ‘double effect’) of bringing about a good
result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about
the same good end. This reasoning is summarized with the claim that sometimes it is permissible to
bring about as a merely foreseen side effect a harmful event that it would be impermissible to bring
about intentionally.”); cf. Evangelium Vitae from Pope John Paul II para. 73 (Mar. 25, 1995),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html (“[W]hen it is not possible to overturn or completely
abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured
abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a
law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality.
This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and
proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.” (emphasis added)).
87. E.g., 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Suzio) (“If you’re going
to say that taking human life in the form of a legal execution is wrong going forward, then it’s
wrong going backwards. . . . If you can support the execution of the Petit family killers for what
they did five years ago, why couldn’t you support it if it should occur two years from now or three
years from now or 20 years from now? It strikes me as an ungravely inconsistent moral position to
take. . . . No matter what good you want to do in life, you can’t achieve that good using morally
illicit means. I bring that up because I suspect that one reason why there’s this big gaping . . . moral
hole in this law is because of the political consequences of making it an absolute both prospectively,
as well as retrospectively.”).
88. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (stating that retribution is, among other
things, “an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim”).
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Because many of their colleagues believed that the death penalty was an
appropriate punishment, at least with respect to the eleven men currently
on death row, a retroactive repeal bill simply did not have sufficient
support.89 Rather than allow death penalty repeal to fail, many legislators
who supported retroactive repeal settled for prospective-only repeal
instead. These legislators did not support prospective-only repeal for the
purpose of retribution or deterrence; rather, they did so for the purpose of
eliminating the death penalty in Connecticut. This is a significant
distinction.
When legislators change the purpose for which the death penalty exists
(in this case from punishing offenders to abolishing the death penalty), they
may also change the morality of the means.90 Imposing death on some so
that no others will ever be put to death is not punishment—it is sacrifice. It
does not restore community by redressing an offender’s wrong; it improves
community by eliminating an unjust punishment for future offenders. In
this view, the eleven men on Connecticut’s death row are not being
punished; they are being sacrificed.
Of course, sacrifice, like punishment, is not always moral. As I
previously observed:
[w]hen we talk about sacrifice, we often think of those
who willingly offer themselves up for a higher good like God
or country. This is the stuff of heroes and martyrs and, for
many, it is to be celebrated.
Being sacrificed, on the other hand, has a very different
connotation. It’s not about those who choose their fate, but
those whose fate is chosen for them. They are lambs, plucked
from the field and thrown onto the altar for some higher good.
This bothers us—and it should. Who among us has the right
to decide the fate of innocent others for some purported good?

89. See also CT’s January 2013 Response, supra note 78, at 19 & n.14 (“[N]ot everyone [in
the Connecticut legislature] who voted for prospective repeal is morally opposed to capital
punishment.” (citing legislative history)). Compare 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28
(statement of Rep. Holder-Winfield) (“[I]n 2009 when I attempted to completely abolish the death
penalty, I came to the realization that the only way to move forward was with the bill that was
prospective.”), with 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Kissel) (“You
guys . . . support the death penalty prospectively only, because the votes aren’t there to do it across
the board . . . .”).
90. But cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Conn. in Support of the
Supplemental Brief of the Defendant with Attached Appendix at 8, State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566
(Conn. Dec. 3, 2012) (No. SC17413) [hereinafter ACLU-CT Brief], available at
http://ctbriefsonline.com/Briefs/SC17413ac3.pdf (“By repealing the death penalty prospectively, the
General Assembly has, in effect, sacrificed Santiago to end the death penalty for everyone. As
Justice Marshall stated in Furman, the Constitution does not permit legislatures to make ‘sacrificial
lambs’ of its citizenry. Fundamental fairness prohibits it.” (emphasis added)).
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This is the stuff of genocide and is to be avoided at all costs.91
While it is exceedingly difficult to imagine circumstances in which
sacrificing others is morally defensible, prospective-only repeal may
present such a circumstance. “The [eleven] men on [Connecticut’s] death
row are no martyrs, nor are they innocents plucked from the field.”92 And
because they are already sentenced to death, the legislature’s failure to
intervene leaves them no worse off than before. “In these [eleven] men,
Connecticut’s legislature saw an opportunity to do something” for the
higher good.93
The legislature has, in effect, taken these 11 men from the
death chamber and walked them to the altar. It has
transformed their punishment into an act of sacrifice. From
wolves, lambs. Yes, these 11 men remain on death row, but
now they die for something; they die so that others will not be
put to death.
This is the uneasy morality of gradual abolition. Dying,
these men destroy our death penalty.94
Punishing a person for committing murder on day one but not on day two
may well be morally incoherent. But gradual abolition is not only about
punishment; it is also about sacrifice. While it may be immoral to punish
eleven men with death post-repeal, it may not necessarily be immoral to
sacrifice them for the sake of ending the death penalty.95 Prospective-only
repeal may transform an immoral punishment into a moral sacrifice.96
91. Kevin Barry, Are Death Row Inmates Sacrificial Lambs?, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 9,
2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-11-09/news/hc-op-barry-are-death-row-inmates-sacrificallambs-20121109_1_death-row-death-penalty-abolition; see also C.D. BROAD, BROAD’S CRITICAL
ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 278 (1971) (“[C]ommon-sense holds that it may be right and
praiseworthy for a person voluntarily to make sacrifices which it would be wrong for anyone else to
impose on him.”).
92. Barry, supra note 91.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. BROAD, supra note 91, at 275, 277 (discussing “the sacrifices which a person may
legitimately impose on others,” and stating that “it does not follow that, when one has taken
account of the features which distinguish a person from a brute or an inanimate thing, and has
endeavored to give weight to them, it is never right to treat him in certain respects as if he were one
or the other. It is not clear, e.g., that it is never right to compel a person to do what he believes to be
wrong . . . For, although he is a person, he is not the only one . . . .”). As distasteful as this line of
moral reasoning may be, it may serve the cause of abolition in the end by revealing what Professor
Austin Sarat has called the “sadism that is at the heart of the state’s tenacious attachment to capital
punishment” and by “invit[ing] the ‘bad taste’” of the public. AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE
KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION 208 (2001).
96. One might reasonably argue that Connecticut’s prospective-only repeal did not sacrifice
eleven men to end the death penalty—it sacrificed nine men out of a desire for retribution against
Joshua Komisarjevsky and Steven Hayes. Likewise, the argument goes, New Mexico’s prospective-
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III. THE LEGALITY OF PROSPECTIVE-ONLY REPEAL
Having briefly touched on the utility and morality of prospective-only
death penalty repeal, Part III turns in depth to the legality of prospectiveonly death penalty repeal. Section A analyzes prospective-only death
penalty repeal in the context of statutory construction, and Section B turns
to the Eighth Amendment question raised by prospective-only repeal.97
A. Clearly Prospective-Only Death Penalty Repeals Are Not Given
Retroactive Effect
1. Retroactivity Basics
Rules of statutory construction require that courts give effect to the
only repeal did not sacrifice two men to end the death penalty—it sacrificed them out of a desire for
retribution against Michael Astorga. But for Komisarjevsky, Hayes, and Astorga, one might argue,
Connecticut and New Mexico might have repealed their death penalties retroactively. These
arguments have merit. To the extent that some legislators were motivated by these retributive
purposes, their sacrifice was not a moral one.
97. Before analyzing the legality of prospective-only repeal, an important distinction should
be made between the retroactivity of statutes (statutory retroactivity), which is squarely at issue in
the context of prospective-only repeal, and the retroactivity of judicial decisions interpreting the
constitutionality of those statutes (judicial retroactivity), which is not. The retroactivity of a new
capital sentencing statute is controlled by rules of statutory construction and by courts’
interpretation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It is therefore different from the
retroactivity of a new constitutional ruling by a court, which is controlled by judicial precedent,
namely, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). In 1989, in Teague, the Supreme Court held that
“new constitutional rules of criminal procedure” declared by the court, while applicable to cases
pending on direct review, “will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the
new rules are announced,” unless one of two exceptions applies. Id. at 310. According to the Court,
a new rule should be applied retroactively “if it places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe’” or “if it requires the
observance of ‘those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id. at 307
(alteration in original) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Just four months later, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court confirmed that
Teague’s non-retroactivity analysis applies to capital sentencing proceedings, but held that court
decisions prohibiting the execution of certain classes of prisoners (such as those with intellectual
disabilities) would nevertheless be retroactive because they fell within the first Teague exception.
See 492 U.S. 302, 329–30 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
In sum, Teague has to do with judicial retroactivity, which means that if a court were to find a
prospective-only death penalty repeal statute unconstitutional, “evenhanded justice” would require
“that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. The fact
that such a ruling would be retroactive under Teague, however, has nothing to do with whether a
statute will be given retroactive effect. That is an issue of statutory retroactivity which, as set forth
in this Part, implicates rules of statutory construction and courts’ interpretation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Teague is simply not relevant to this determination. For a helpful
discussion of Teague’s non-retroactivity analysis, see generally Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on
Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the
Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161 (2005).
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plain language of a statute, provided that it does not lead to absurd
results.98 Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction, courts are dutybound to prohibit retroactive application of laws that are unambiguously
prospective-only, and to give retroactive effect to laws that are
unambiguously retroactive.99 Accordingly, many statutes contain a socalled savings clause that explicitly provides that the statute applies only to
conduct committed, or to convictions or sentences that occur, on or after a
date certain.100 Other statutes explicitly state the opposite—that the statute
applies “irrespective of whether the crime was committed, the conviction
had, or the sentence imposed, before or after” a date certain.101
Importantly, courts’ obligation to give retroactive effect to
unambiguously retroactive laws is subject to an important caveat:
retroactive legislation typically does not apply to final judgments.102
According to the Supreme Court, “Congress can always revise the
judgments of Article III courts in one sense: When a new law makes clear
that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing
judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted,
and must alter the outcome accordingly.”103 Once “all appeals have been
forgone or completed,” however, “[i]t is the obligation of the last court in
the hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect to Congress's latest
98. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989) (“[W]here . . . the
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms. . . . except in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. In such cases, the intention of the drafters,
rather than the strict language, controls.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 487 (1917); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564, 571 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
99. See id.; e.g., Meade v. Comm’r of Corr., 920 A.2d 301, 304 (Conn. 2007) (“When
considering the retroactivity of a penal statute, ‘[i]t is axiomatic that, [w]hether to apply a statute
retroactively or prospectively depends upon the intent of the legislature.’” (alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985, 1020 (Conn. 2006))). The retroactivity of a penal statute is,
of course, subject to the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. See infra note 219.
100. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 (discussing Connecticut and New Mexico death penalty repeal
statutes); supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing a Kansas death penalty repeal bill).
101. Act of Mar. 12, 1965, ch. 40, 1965 W. Va. Acts 202, 207; see infra note 270 and
accompanying text (discussing West Virginia and North Dakota death penalty repeal statutes); cf.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.06(E) (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 47 of the 130th Gen.
Assemb.) (“This section [making capital offenders eligible for a death sentence on
resentencing] . . . shall apply equally to all such offenders sentenced to death prior to, on, or after
March 23, 2005, including offenders who, on March 23, 2005, are challenging their sentence of
death and offenders whose sentence of death has been set aside, nullified, or vacated by any court of
this state or any federal court but who, as of March 23, 2005, have not yet been resentenced.”);
State v. White, 972 N.E.2d 534, 543 (2012) (concluding that “[b]y enacting [§ 2929.06(E)], the
General Assembly has clearly expressed its intent that [the statute making capital offenders eligible
for a death sentence on resentencing] apply retroactively”).
102. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
103. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995).
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enactment . . . . Having achieved finality, . . . a judicial decision becomes
the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or
controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that
the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the
courts said it was.”104 Doing so, the Court held, violates “[t]he
Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial powers.”105
In the criminal context, this means that ameliorative legislation—that is,
legislation that is less onerous than prior law—is typically not held to apply
retroactively to final sentences.106 Debate over the retroactivity of criminal
104. Id. at 226–27.
105. Id. at 240 (“We know of no previous instance in which Congress has enacted retroactive
legislation requiring an Article III court to set aside a final judgment, and for good reason. The
Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial powers denies it the authority to do so.”).
106. See Harold J. Krent, Retroactivity and Crack Sentencing Reform, 47 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 53, 74 (2013) (discussing federal and state courts’ reluctance to apply legislation
retroactively to final sentences, noting separation of powers concerns under both Article III
(usurping judicial authority) and Article II (usurping executive’s pardon authority)); id. at 74 &
n.148 (discussing federal and state legislature’s reluctance to pass legislation altering final
sentences); S. David Mitchell, In with the New, Out with the Old: Explaining the Scope of
Retroactive Amelioration, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 28–29 (2009) (stating that courts’ and legislatures’
“current practice of retroactive amelioration is inadequate because an entire class of defendants,
namely post-final judgment defendants, is barred from benefiting from the ameliorative sentencing
changes”); Comment, supra note 15, at 145 (“[A]meliorative legislation has never been held to
apply to finalized convictions. It is well-settled that a legislative change will not arrest or interfere
with execution of sentence.”), cited in Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660 (1974); id. (noting
finality and separation-of-powers concerns); see also Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321,
2330 (2012) (holding that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced sentences of crack offenders
whose sentences became final after—but not before—enactment of FSA); Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“Congress may not revise judicial determinations by retroactive
legislation reopening judgments.” (citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 225–26)); United States v. Blewett,
Nos. 12-5226, 12-5582, 2013 WL 6231727, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) (“Consistent with a 142–
year–old congressional presumption against applying reductions in criminal penalties to those
already sentenced, consistent with the views of all nine Justices and all of the litigants in Dorsey v.
United States, consistent with the decisions of every other court of appeals in the country, and
consistent with dozens of our own decisions, we hold that the [Fair Sentencing] Act does not
retroactively undo final sentences.” (citations omitted)).
Despite the weight of authority against ameliorative legislation’s application to final
judgments, significant questions remain regarding whether such legislation violates separation-ofpowers principles. Although an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, some
introductory thoughts are instructive. First, the Plaut majority’s central premise—that Congress has
no authority to reopen final judgments—was highly contested. Three justices, one concurring and
two dissenting, argued that Congress does have that authority. Compare Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240
(stating that “Constitution's separation of legislative and judicial powers denies it the authority” to
“enact[] retroactive legislation requiring an Article III court to set aside a final judgment”), with id.
241–42 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[A]t least sometimes Congress lacks the power under Article I to
reopen an otherwise closed court judgment.”), and id. at 247 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)
(“Throughout our history, Congress has passed laws that allow courts to reopen final judgments.”).
Indeed, in Dorsey, the Supreme Court implied this authority in dictum, stating that
“disparities . . . will exist whenever Congress enacts a new law changing sentences (unless
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statutes instead tends to focus on cases involving those who committed
criminal acts before the effective date of the ameliorative legislation but
were not convicted or sentenced, or did not exhaust their direct appeals,
until after the effective date of the legislation.107
This issue of finality aside, some further complexity arises when the
statute is silent or otherwise ambiguous as to whether it is retroactive or
prospective-only. Where an ambiguous statute is more onerous than
existing law, “impos[ing] new burdens on persons after the fact,” there is a

Congress intends re-opening sentencing proceedings concluded prior to a new law's effective
date).” 132 S. Ct. at 2335. Likewise, in Blewett, the Sixth Circuit joined “[e]very other federal court
of appeals” in holding that the Fair Sentencing Act “does not apply to individuals sentenced before
its effective date,” but strongly implied that Congress could have made the Act retroactive to
offenders already sentenced if it had wanted to. Compare Blewett, 2013 WL at *1 (holding that the
Fair Sentencing Act “does not retroactively undo final sentences”), with id. at *2 (stating that “[t]he
Fair Sentencing Act nowhere provides that it covers offenders sentenced before it became effective.
Nor do the Act's clear implications show a desire to apply the new law to offenders already
sentenced”), and id. at *13 (“Congress should think seriously about making the new minimums
retroactive. . . . Any request for a sentence reduction must be addressed to a higher tribunal (the
Supreme Court) or to a different forum altogether (the Congress and the President).”). Blewett’s
dissenting opinions also assume Congress’s authority to apply the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively
to final sentences. See, e.g., id. at *41 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he scheme set up by Congress
contemplates not only that finality is not sacrosanct, but that consideration whether a change should
be available for application to offenders already under sentence should be a part of the very process
of making changes, and the determination left to the Commission's sound discretion.”); see also
Krent, supra, at 73–77 (distinguishing Plaut and arguing that separation-of-powers principles do
not prevent Congress from applying ameliorative legislation to final sentences).
Second, Plaut’s holding was narrow. Plaut involved “retroactive legislation requiring an
Article III court to set aside a final judgment”; if the retroactive legislation had required the court to
review the judgment but had given the court discretion to set it aside, Plaut might have gone the
other way. Id. at 240 (emphasis added); see id. at 231–32 (stating that a retroactive legislative
change “subject to the control of the courts themselves would obviously raise no issue of separation
of powers”). The Smarter Sentencing Act now pending in Congress is a case in point. That
legislation would allow certain inmates sentenced before the effective date of the Fair Sentencing
Act to petition for sentence reductions consistent with the Fair Sentencing Act, and would give
courts the discretion to impose a reduced sentence. See Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, S. 1410,
113th Cong. § 3(b), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1410/text (“A court
that imposed a sentence for a covered offense, may, on motion of the defendant, the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the court, impose a reduced sentence as if
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense
was committed.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also Durbin and Lee Introduce Smarter
Sentencing Act, U.S. SENATE (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=be68ad86-a0a4-4486-853f-f8ef7b99e736.
Finally, and of particular importance to this Article, separation-of-powers principles have not
stopped several state legislatures from passing legislation that retroactively repealed the death
penalty in all cases—final and not final. See infra note 270 (discussing North Dakota, West
Virginia, and New Jersey repeals); cf. Krent, supra, at 74–77 (arguing that Congress has passed
noncapital legislation that retroactively altered final judgments).
107. See infra Subsection III.A.2 (discussing retroactivity in non-final cases).
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“presumption against statutory retroactivity.”108 The statute will be given
only prospective effect because imposing new burdens after the fact is
“unfair[].”109 Indeed, in the criminal context, “[i]f the new legislation
increase[s] the punishment for the same crime, or ma[kes] previously
lawful activity unlawful, the ex post facto clause preclude[s] prosecution
under the new statute of offenses committed before the statute’s effective
date.”110
Where the ambiguous statute is more lenient than existing law,
removing a burden “by repealing a penal provision (whether criminal or
civil),” the common law deemed such a repeal to be retroactive as to
judgments that were not yet final.111 In 1871, Congress abolished this
presumption through passage of a general savings statute, which provides
that “a new criminal statute that ‘repeal[s]’ an older criminal statute shall
not change the penalties ‘incurred’ under that older statute ‘unless the
repealing Act shall so expressly provide.’. . . Penalties are ‘incurred’ under
the older statute when an offender becomes subject to them, i.e., commits
the underlying conduct that makes the offender liable.”112 In other words,
under the federal general savings statute, ameliorative federal legislation is
not considered to be retroactive absent explicit language to the contrary or
some other “indicia of congressional intent.”113 In the absence of such
108. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994).
109. Id.
110. Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Dobbert v. Florida,
432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977) (“It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous
than the prior law.”). For further discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause, see infra note 219.
111. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270–71. This is known as the doctrine of abatement. As the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in Bradley v. United States, “At common law, the repeal of a criminal statute
abated all prosecutions which had not reached final disposition”—i.e., the imposition of a
sentence—“in the highest court authorized to review them.” 410 U.S. 605, 607 (1973). To avoid
such results, legislatures frequently indicated an intention not to abate pending prosecutions by
including in the repealing statute a specific clause stating that prosecutions of offenses under the
repealed statute were not to be abated.” Id. at 609–10; see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,
230, 232 (1964) (reciting the “universal common-law rule that when the legislature repeals a
criminal statute or otherwise removes the State's condemnation from conduct that was formerly
deemed criminal, this action requires the dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding charging such
conduct. The rule applies to any such proceeding which, at the time of the supervening legislation,
has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it. . . . In the present
case the judgment is not yet final, for it is on direct review in this Court.”); Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66
(“At common law, [repeals of criminal statutes] applied retroactively, abating every prosecution
which had not yet resulted in final conviction (including appeal to the highest reviewing court)—
unless a special provision had been enacted to save prosecutions under the repealed statute.”).
112. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting
1 U.S.C. § 109).
113. Id. at 2332. “[B]ecause statutes enacted by one Congress cannot bind a later Congress,
which remains free to repeal the earlier statute, to exempt the current statute from the earlier statute,
to modify the earlier statute, or to apply the earlier statute but as modified,” the Supreme Court has
long held that the general savings statute “creates what is in effect a less demanding interpretive
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language or intent, ameliorative federal legislation does not apply to those
who commit their crimes prior to the effective date of the statute—even if
they are not convicted or sentenced, or if the sentence does not become
final, until after the effective date of the statute.114 Most states have passed
similar general savings statutes.115
Although federal courts have overwhelmingly applied the federal
general savings statute to prohibit retroactive application of ameliorative
legislation, a minority of state supreme courts have disregarded their own
savings statutes and given such ameliorative legislation retroactive
effect.116 Other state supreme courts have given retroactive effect to
ameliorative legislation pursuant to ameliorative amendments to their
savings statutes, which permit individuals to benefit from subsequent
ameliorative changes to the law.117 Importantly, as noted above, even when
state supreme courts have given retroactive effect to ameliorative
legislation—whether by disregarding their state savings statutes or by
requirement.” Id. at 2331. The result is a general savings statute with moderate bite: it “set[s] forth
an important background principle of interpretation,” but Congress remains free to disregard it
“either expressly or by implication as it chooses.” Id. at 2331–32; see id. at 2340 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that where repeal is not explicit, “the implication from the subsequently enacted
statute must be clear enough to overcome our strong presumption against implied repeals”).
114. United States v. Blewett, Nos. 12-5226, 12-5582, 2013 WL 6231727, at *8 (6th Cir. Dec.
3, 2013) (stating that, “by default under the [federal] savings statute,” ameliorative statutory change
“would not have applied to people who offended before the statute’s effective date, even those
sentenced after the effective date”) (emphasis added); see also Holiday, 683 A.2d at 72–74
(rejecting argument that federal general savings statute “is limited to preserving sentences already
imposed”). But cf. Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2335 (stating that, in non-capital cases involving
application of federal sentencing guidelines, “the ordinary practice is to apply new penalties to
defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants already sentenced”).
115. Mitchell, supra note 106, at 8 n.48, 20, 47–51 (compiling state savings statutes); id. at
47–51 (listing four state constitutions that contain savings provisions). The Holiday court
explained,
As a way of preventing abatements of criminal prosecutions and other
liabilities when legislatures failed to provide special savings clauses in the
repealing legislation, state legislatures began in the last century to adopt general
savings statutes applicable thereafter to all repeals, amendments, and reenactments
of criminal and civil liabilities. For criminal prosecutions, therefore, these statutes
shifted the legislative presumption from one of abatement unless otherwise
specified to one of non-abatement in the absence of contrary legislative direction.
683 A.2d at 66 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Mitchell, supra note 106, at 29. State courts have justified their disregard of general
savings statutes for a number of reasons, including that the general savings statute is itself
ambiguous; that following the general savings statute would be inconsistent with legislative intent;
and that general savings statutes prohibit the retroactive application of more onerous laws but not
ameliorative ones. Id. at 29–32.
117. Id. (compiling state savings statutes, ten of which contain exceptions allowing retroactive
application of ameliorative legislation in cases that are not final); see also Comment, supra note 15,
at 129 & nn.66–69 (1972) (compiling ameliorative amendments).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6

342

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

following ameliorative amendments to those statutes—they have stopped
short of disturbing final sentences.118 These courts appear willing to give
retroactive effect to ameliorative legislation only in cases that have not
resulted in a final judgment.119
The upshot is that, generally speaking, “legislation, especially of the
criminal sort, is not to be applied retroactively.”120 Federal courts and a
majority of state courts hold that, absent some express intent of the
legislature to the contrary, “ameliorative criminal sentencing laws
repealing harsher ones in force at the time of the commission of an
offense” are not given retroactive effect.121 This is consistent with the
118. Compare Comment, supra note 15, at 133 (discussing court’s disregard of savings statute
where “amendatory statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the date of appellate
finalization”), with Mitchell, supra note 106, at 20 (noting that ameliorative amendment exceptions
to general saving statutes are “restricted . . . to pre-final judgment defendants, resulting in a limited
number of defendants being eligible to receive the benefits of an ameliorative sentencing change”).
119. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
120. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (emphasis added). One wellrecognized exception is for procedural legislation, which generally is applied retroactively
notwithstanding a general savings statute. Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660–61 (1974)
(stating that the federal general savings statute “does not ordinarily preserve discarded remedies or
procedures”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481, 88
Stat. 1455, 1455; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275 (1994) (noting “the
diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure” and stating that “[c]hanges in procedural rules
may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about
retroactivity”); 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 23:38, at 566–67 (7th ed. 2009) (“[R]ights which are not substantive and private
in nature . . . are beyond the scope of general saving statutes, and are eliminated by repeal of their
derivative source.”). Although the line between substantive and procedural legislation is not always
clear, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that legislation affecting “all forms of punishment for
crime” is not procedural; it affects substantive rights and is therefore subject to the federal general
savings statute. Marrero, 417 U.S. at 661. Compare id. (citing Jones v. United States, 327 F.2d 867
(D.C. Cir. 1963)) (holding that ineligibility for parole was “punishment” and was therefore
preserved by 1 U.S.C. § 109)), and Jones, 327 F.2d at 871 (concluding that the death sentence was
preserved by 1 U.S.C. § 109), with United States v. Obermeier, 186 F.2d 243, 254–55 (2d Cir.
1950) (holding that “a statute of limitations is considered no part of a ‘right’ or ‘liability,’ but as
affecting the ‘remedy’ only,” and was therefore not preserved by 1 U.S.C. § 109).
121. Marrero, 417 U.S. at 661; see, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315–16 (2001)
(“[C]ongressional enactments . . . will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their
language requires this result.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), superseded by statute on
other grounds, REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 302, 310;
id. at 316–17 (“A statute may not be applied retroactively . . . absent a clear indication from
Congress that it intended such a result. . . . The standard for finding such unambiguous direction is
a demanding one. [C]ases where this Court has found truly retroactive effect adequately authorized
by statute have involved statutory language that was so clear that it could sustain only one
interpretation.” (alteration in original) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 (“When a case implicates a federal
statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has
expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need
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principle articulated in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, a case in which the
Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of statutory provisions creating
a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations
of Title VII, providing for a jury trial if such damages were claimed. In
Landgraf, the Court stated:
It will frequently be true . . . that retroactive application of
a new statute would vindicate its purpose more fully. That
consideration, however, is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption against retroactivity. Statutes are seldom crafted
to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their
enactment may require adopting means other than those that
would most effectively pursue the main goal. A legislator who
supported a prospective statute might reasonably oppose
retroactive application of the same statute. Indeed, there is
reason to believe that the omission of [a prior bill’s] express
retroactivity provisions was a factor in the passage of the [bill
that became law]. Section 102 [of the law] is plainly not the
sort of provision that must be understood to operate
retroactively because a contrary reading would render it
ineffective.122
Importantly, this determination does not change when the prospective-only
repeal applies to the death penalty, as multiple federal and state courts have
made clear.123 In nearly all cases, death row inmates remain eligible for
death notwithstanding the subsequent repeal of the death penalty or the
procedures used to implement it.124

to resort to judicial default rules.”); id. at 273, 278–79 (harmonizing the “presumption against
statutory retroactivity” and “explicitly retroactive statutes”); State v. Reis, 165 P.3d 980, 996 (Haw.
2007) (“[T]he inclusion of a specific savings clause within an amendment—the polar opposite of an
express retroactivity provision—must operate as clear evidence of the legislature’s intention that the
act in question should apply prospectively only. Indeed, where a specific savings clause has been
included in amendatory legislation, the general trend among the states nationally is, in fact, not to
apply the amendments retroactively, even when they are ameliorative.”); Holiday v. United States,
683 A.2d 61, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[A]bsent an express provision specifying the class or classes to
which the new sentencing scheme applies, we cannot conclude that, ‘obviously’ and inevitably, the
legislature must have intended a retroactive, rather than a prospective, approach.”); id. at 80 (“[I]f
the Council had intended for the repeal of mandatory-minimum sentences to apply retroactively—to
pending prosecutions, either pre-sentence or pre-final judgment—express language to that effect
could have been included.”). See generally Mitchell, supra note 106, at 29–37 (discussing judicial
retroactive amelioration).
122. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 285–86 (footnote omitted).
123. See, e.g., Jones, 327 F.2d at 869–71 (applying both the federal general savings statute, 1
U.S.C. § 109, and repeal statute’s savings clause in refusing to give retroactive effect to an
ameliorative statute eliminating mandatory death penalty).
124. See, e.g., id.
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2. Retroactivity and the Death Penalty
This subsection addresses the issue of retroactivity and the death
penalty. It first reviews several cases in federal and state jurisprudence
where the courts refused to give retroactive effect to prospective-only
repeal. It then turns to consideration of circumstances under which the
courts took the opposite approach.
a. Cases Refusing to Give Retroactive Effect to Prospective-Only
Repeal
In Jones v. United States, the D.C. Circuit held that the defendant, who
was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death under a
mandatory death penalty, could not benefit from a subsequent law
repealing the mandatory death penalty and allowing a jury (or, in the case
of pending cases, a judge) to decide between execution or life
imprisonment.125 The court noted that the repeal was “obviously
prospective in operation” because it “contained no language applying its
ameliorating provisions to previously committed offenses” and instead
included a specific savings clause preserving the defendant’s sentence
under the prior statute.126 “Quite apart from the [statute’s savings clause],”
the court added, the federal general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109,
conclusively established “that the death sentence not only was mandatory,
final and unreviewable, but that sentence had not been vacated by the
[repeal].”127
Jones’s reasoning finds explicit support in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in the non-capital case of Warden v. Marrero.128 In that case, the
Court refused to give retroactive effect to a prospective-only federal
statute, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, which removed ineligibility for parole for certain drug crimes.129
According to the Court, the Act’s savings clause required this result by
explicitly prohibiting application of the Act to “[p]rosecutions for any
violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of [the Act].”130 The
Court also premised its decision on the federal general savings statute, 1
125. Id.
126. Id. at 871. At the time, the repeal statute’s savings clause read, “Cases tried prior to the
effective date of this Act and which are before the court for the purpose of sentence or resentence
shall be governed by the provisions of law in effect prior to the effective date of this Act.” Act of
Mar. 22, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-423, 76 Stat. 46 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-2104
(West, Westlaw through 2013)).
127. Jones, 327 F.2d at 870–71.
128. 417 U.S. 653, 660–61 (1974), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Oct. 26,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481, 88 Stat. 1455, 1455.
129. Id. at 657–59; accord Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609–10 (1973).
130. Marrero, 417 U.S. at 655–56 & n.4 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1103(a),
84 Stat. 1236, 1294) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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U.S.C. § 109, citing Jones for the proposition that § 109 “bar[s] application
of ameliorative criminal sentencing laws repealing harsher ones in force at
the time of the commission of an offense.”131
Significantly, the prisoner in Marrero argued that, by removing
ineligibility for parole,
Congress completely changed its approach to regulation of
narcotics offenses in the 1970 Act, jettisoning the retributive
approach of the [prior] law in favor of emphasis in the 1970
Act upon rehabilitation of the narcotics offender. . . . [I]n light
of this basic change, little purpose is served by denying
respondent eligibility for parole, indeed that such denial
frustrates the current congressional goal of rehabilitating
narcotics offenders.132
While acknowledging the “undeniable” force of this argument, the Court
rejected it, stating that it was “addressed to the wrong governmental
branch.133 Punishment for federal crimes is a matter for Congress, subject
to judicial veto only when the legislative judgment oversteps constitutional
bounds.”134 The statute’s own savings clause, together with the federal
savings statute, “saved from repeal the bar of parole eligibility under [the
prior statute], and, however severe the consequences for respondent,
Congress trespassed no constitutional limits.”135
Support for prospective-only repeal of death penalty legislation can
arguably be found in one of the Supreme Court’s most infamous death
penalty cases, Rosenberg v. United States.136 On April 5, 1951, Julius and
131. Id. at 661 (citing Jones, 327 F.2d 867; United States v. Kirby, 176 F.2d 101 (2d Cir.
1949); Lovely v. United States, 175 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1949)).
132. Id. at 664.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Many lower federal courts and state supreme courts have similarly rejected retroactive
application of clearly prospective-only sentencing statutes in the noncapital context. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ross, 464 F.2d 376, 378–79 (2d Cir. 1972) (refusing to give retroactive effect to a
portion of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which liberalized
sentences for drug crimes); id. at 380 (distinguishing two Supreme Court cases in which laws were
applied retroactively on grounds that those cases involved decriminalization of conduct, namely,
consumption of alcohol and equal access to public accommodations); State v. Reis, 165 P.3d 980,
981–82, 991 n.19 (Haw. 2007) (refusing to give retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute
allowing probation for first-time nonviolent drug offenders because the “plain language [of the
savings clause] bar[red] retroactive application”).
136. 346 U.S. 273 (1953). Rosenberg was decided in a very short per curiam order on June 19,
1953. Id. at 288 (per curiam). Two concurring opinions were delivered that same day, with the same
six Justices joining the two concurrences. See id. at 289 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 293 (Clark,
J., concurring). A few weeks later, Chief Justice Fred Vinson filed the opinion of the Court, which
was joined by the same Justices who had joined the earlier concurrences. Id. at 277 (majority
opinion). Accordingly, the same six-Justice majority backed three separate opinions. For simplicity,
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Ethel Rosenberg were sentenced to death for conspiracy to commit
espionage during a time of war, in violation of the Espionage Act of
1917.137 On June 17, 1953, just two days before their execution,138 Justice
William Douglas granted a stay of execution to address whether the
Rosenbergs’ death sentences, which were imposed without
recommendation of a jury and without a finding that the offense was
committed with the intent to injure the United States, violated the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, which authorized capital punishment only upon jury
recommendation and a finding of such intent.139 “[T]he sole ground of this
stay,” the Court stated, “is that the Atomic Energy Act may have
retrospective application to conspiracies in which the only overt acts were
committed before that statute was enacted.”140 The Court rejected this
claim.141
According to the Court, assuming that the Atomic Energy Act in fact
repealed the Espionage Act,142 “the Government could not have invoked
the Atomic Energy Act against [the] defendants.”143 Because “[t]he crux of
the charge alleged overt acts committed in 1944 and 1945, years before
[the Atomic Energy] Act went into effect,” that Act was inapplicable.144
this Article considers all three opinions to speak for the Court.
137. Id. at 277.
138. See infra text accompanying note 147.
139. Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 283 (describing Justice Douglas’s actions); id. at 294 (Clark, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946’s elements “are not prerequisite to a
sentence of death” under the Espionage Act of 1917); id. at 317 (App’x to Op. of Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (noting neither element was satisfied).
140. Id. at 290 (Jackson, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 289.
142. The Court held that the Atomic Energy Act merely supplemented, rather than repealed,
the Espionage Act and therefore did not apply to the Rosenbergs, who were convicted under the
Espionage Act. Id. at 289 (per curiam) (“The Atomic Energy Act did not repeal or limit the
provisions of the Espionage Act.”); see id. at 290 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he Atomic Energy
Act does not, by text or intention, supersede the earlier Espionage Act. It does not purport to repeal
the earlier Act, nor afford any grounds for spelling out a repeal by implication. Each Act is
complete in itself and each has its own reason for existence and field of operation.”); see also id. at
295 (Clark, J., concurring) (“[I]nstead of repealing the penalty provisions of the Espionage Act, [the
Atomic Energy Act] in fact preserves them in undiminished force. Thus there is no warrant for
superimposing the penalty provisions of the later Act upon the earlier law.”). Significantly, the
Court did not stop there, and held that even if the Atomic Energy Act did repeal the Espionage Act,
it did not apply retroactively to the Rosenberg’s offenses. Id. at 295–96.
143. Id. at 295–96 (Clark, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 295; see also id. at 290 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The crime here involved was
commenced June 6, 1944. This was more than two years before the Atomic Energy Act was passed.
All overt acts relating to atomic energy on which the Government relies took place as early as
January 1945.”); id. at 311 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[O]bviously no criminal statute can have
retroactive application.”). Although the majority reasoned that retroactive application of the Atomic
Energy Act would impose harsher penalties than the Espionage Act in violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause, see id. at 290 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 295–96 (Clark, J., concurring), its
determination that the former Act “authorize[d] capital punishment only upon recommendation of a
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Significantly, Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, writing separately in
dissent, did not dispute that the Atomic Energy Act applied only
prospectively;145 instead, they argued that part of the Rosenbergs’ crime
took place after the Act’s effective date.146 On June 19, 1953, the Court
issued a per curiam opinion vacating the stay, and the Rosenbergs were
executed later that evening.147
While acknowledging the troubling stakes, the majority concluded that
the law was clear; the petition raised a pure “question of statutory
construction” and the majority had “no doubts” as to its answer.148
“Vacating this stay,” Justice Jackson stated in a separate opinion, “is not to
be construed as indorsing the wisdom or appropriateness to this case of a
death sentence. That sentence, however, is permitted by law and, as was
previously pointed out, is therefore not within this Court’s power of
revision.”149 Justice Clark was less contrite: “Though the penalty is great
and our responsibility heavy, our duty is clear.”150
jury and a finding that the offense was committed with intent to injure the United States” belies this
reasoning and suggests that the Atomic Energy Act was ameliorative. Id. at 294 (emphasis added);
see id. at 305–06 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The decisive thing in this case is that under the
Espionage Act the power to impose a sentence of death was left exclusively to the discretion of the
court, while under the Atomic Energy Act a sentence of death can be imposed only upon
recommendation of the jury.”).
145. Id. at 311 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Solicitor General says . . . that the Government
would have been laughed out of court if . . . this case had been laid under the Atomic Energy Act of
1946. I agree. For a part of the crime alleged and proved antedated that Act. And obviously no
criminal statute can have retroactive application.”); see id. at 304–05 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(implying that the Atomic Energy Act was prospective-only).
146. See id. at 311 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat conspiracy, as defined in the indictment
itself, endured almost four years after the Atomic Energy Act became effective.”); see also id. at
305 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the terminal date of the Rosenberg Conspiracy [did
not] precede[] the effective date of the Atomic Energy Act”).
147. The Rosenbergs were executed on June 19, 1953, several hours after the Supreme Court
vacated the stay. Brad Snyder, Taking Great Cases: Lessons from the Rosenberg Case, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 885, 932 (2010).
148. Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 287–88; see id. at 288 (stating that “[m]ore complete statements
of the reasons for our decision are set forth in the opinions of Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice
Clark”).
149. Id. at 292–93 (Jackson, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 296 (Clark, J., concurring); cf. Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 612 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court in Rosenberg “resolved an ambiguity in a statutory
scheme against life, not in its favor”). Lower federal court decisions interpreting the federal death
penalty lend further support to the permissibility of prospective-only repeal as a matter of statutory
construction. In 2008, for example, the Fourth Circuit refused to give retroactive effect to the
Federal Death Penalty Act, which repealed various provisions of an earlier federal death penalty
statute under which the defendant was sentenced. “[U]nder the [Federal] Savings Statute,” the court
concluded, “a liability that arises under a later-repealed statute is preserved despite repeal and may
be enforced by a post-repeal action.” United States v. Stitt, 552 F.3d 345, 353 (4th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Korshin v. Comm’r, 91 F.3d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
reversed “the district court’s decision to sentence [the defendant] to life imprisonment plus 780
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Numerous other state supreme courts have refused to give retroactive
effect to a variety of prospective-only repeals of death penalty statutes as a
matter of statutory construction. Some of these cases involved prospectiveonly repeal of the death penalty for certain offenders and certain crimes.
The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, refused to give retroactive effect
to a prospective-only repeal of the death penalty for people with
intellectual disabilities.151 The Supreme Court of Georgia refused to give
retroactive effect to a prospective-only repeal of the death penalty for
people who were less than seventeen years of age at the time of their
offense.152 And the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to give
retroactive effect to a statute that removed the death penalty for seconddegree rape.153 “[I]n a capital case, just as in any other case,” North
Carolina’s high court stated, “we are not at liberty to disregard established
principles of law in arriving at the intent of the Legislature in enacting a
statute, nor, having determined that intent, may we properly refuse to give
it effect.”154
Many more cases, such as Jones v. United States, involve prospectivemonths” and ordered the court to conduct a new capital sentencing hearing. Id. at 356.
151. Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506, 512 (Ind. 1999) (“[A]bsent a constitutional mandate for
the rule exempting mentally retarded individuals, this Court is neither expected nor required to
engage in retroactivity analysis. Rather, the extent of our writ is to enforce the law as it was at the
time [he] committed his crimes.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d
760, 786 (Ind.1997))). The Tennessee Supreme Court similarly refused to give retroactive effect, as
a matter of statutory construction, to a prospective-only repeal of the death penalty for people with
intellectual disabilities. See Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 798 (Tenn. 2001). According to the
court:
[T]he absence of express language providing for retroactive application supports
the conclusion that the legislature did not expressly intend [a
retroactive] application. As the State contends, other Public Acts demonstrate that
when retroactive application is intended, the General Assembly includes specific,
clear language expressing its intent. Such clear language is absent from [the repeal
statute]. In short, notwithstanding the presence of some ambiguous language in the
statute and in the legislative history, there is no evidence of a clear legislative
intent to apply the statute retroactively as required by the general rule.
Id. But see infra notes 318–21 and accompanying text (discussing Van Tran’s holding that the death
sentence nevertheless violated the state and federal constitutions).
152. Cobb v. State, 152 S.E.2d 403, 406 (Ga. 1966) (“The trial judge here properly ruled that
[a statute providing that any minor less than seventeen years of age at the time of an alleged offense
could not be given the death penalty] could not be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the
appellant.”), rev’d per curiam, Cobb v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 12 (1967).
153. State v. Williams, 212 S.E.2d 113, 119–20 (N.C. 1975) (“We construe the provision in
the 1974 Act, ‘This act shall become . . . applicable to all offenses hereafter committed’ as a saving
clause, showing the intent of the Legislature to leave the preexisting statute in effect as to the
elements of and punishment for the crime of rape committed prior to 8 April 1974. Otherwise, that
provision of the Act would be a mere meaningless redundancy.” (alteration in original)).
154. Id. at 119.
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only repeal of various death penalty procedures. For example, the supreme
courts of Connecticut,155 Florida,156 Indiana,157 Maryland,158 Tennessee,159
and Utah160 all refused to give retroactive effect to prospective-only
statutes that required the jury to consider life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole as a sentencing option. The Indiana Supreme Court
refused to give retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute requiring
courts to instruct the jury on the potential for consecutive or concurrent
sentencing.161 The Supreme Court of Nebraska refused to give retroactive
155. Dortch v. State, 110 A.2d 471, 476 (Conn. 1954) (“The murder for which the plaintiff
stands convicted was committed on September 3, 1949. Judgment was rendered upon the verdict on
February 23, 1950. . . . [The repeal statute] did not become effective until October 1, 1951. . . . The
legislature expressed no intent that [the repeal statute] should operate retrospectively, and it has no
retrospective effect.”); id. at 472 (“[The repeal statute] gives to the jury before whom any
prosecution for a murder is tried the power to recommend imprisonment for life . . . .”).
156. Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6, 10 (Fla. 1999) (“In 1994, the Legislature enacted [a statute
which] ma[de] life without the possibility of parole the alternative punishment to a death sentence
for the crime of first-degree murder. . . . [T]he amended sentencing statute applies to all crimes
committed after May 25, 1994. We find no unequivocal language that the Legislature intended this
amendment to apply retroactively[.]”); accord Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 547 (Fla. 2009).
157. State v. Alcorn, 638 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind. 1994) (“[A]ppellee’s trial is governed by
the death penalty statute that was in effect at the time of the offense. The jury has no authority to
apply the amended statute in this case since the saving clause makes the statute inapplicable to
murders that were committed before June 30, 1993.”); id. at 1244 (“As amended, [the death penalty
statute] allows a trial court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole as an
alternative sentence to death.”); accord State v. Azania, 875 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind. 2007).
158. Collins v. State, 568 A.2d 1, 15 (Md. 1990) (“We rule the life without parole sentencing
option is only available for offenses occurring after the effective date of the provision, July 1, 1987.
The instant offense occurred prior to the effective date.” (citation omitted)); accord Booth v. State,
608 A.2d 162, 174 (Md. 1992).
159. State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 213–14 (Tenn. 2000) (“[T]he plain language of the statute
[permitting the jury to consider life without parole] applies only to cases in which the offense was
committed after July 1, 1993 . . . .”); accord State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Tenn. 1998).
160. State v. Andrews, 843 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1992) (holding that the trial court “did not
err in concluding that the new sentencing option [of life without parole] has no retroactive
application to defendant, whose date of sentence occurred on November 27, 1974”); accord
Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp. 659, 662 (D. Utah 1992) (refusing, on habeas review, to give
retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute adding option of life without possibility of parole, but
suggesting that the result might be different if the prospective-only statute were passed before
defendant’s conviction became final); id. (“There is no obligation that a state accord retroactive
effect to new substantive statutes to allow a convicted person the benefit of a new statute where the
conviction is final. The state’s interest in maintaining the finality of convictions and sentences
justifies a prospective legislative limitation.”).
161. See Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 160 n.7 (Ind. 1999) (“Under our current death
penalty sentencing statute, courts should instruct the jury on the potential for consecutive or
concurrent sentencing, and the court’s failure to provide the jury with a verdict form which included
the possibility of sentencing a defendant to life imprisonment without parole would have been
error. Because [the defendant] committed his crime on August 12, 1986, however, the law which
was in force on that date applies to him. It is a well established rule of our criminal jurisprudence
that the law which applies is that law in effect at the time the crime is committed.” (citation
omitted)).
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effect to a prospective-only statute that required the court to determine the
propriety of a death sentence in light of previous cases involving the same
or similar circumstances.162 The Supreme Court of California refused to
give retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute that limited the
evidence relevant to the prosecution’s case for aggravation.163 And both the
Supreme Court of California and the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to
give retroactive effect to prospective-only statutes that required courts to
instruct juries with respect to the balancing of aggravating and mitigating
factors.164 According to the Supreme Court of California, “[t]he
presumption that a criminal defendant is entitled to an ameliorative change
in the law is just that—a presumption—which plainly does not apply
where, as here, the new law provides otherwise.”165
Further examples include courts’ refusal to give retroactive effect to
prospective-only statutes changing the method of execution;166 amending
the aggravating factors required to sentence a person to death;167 giving the
district attorney discretion to seek the death penalty against defendants
tried and convicted of first-degree murder;168 authorizing bifurcated trials
in capital cases and permitting defendants to offer certain evidence in
mitigation of punishment;169 and replacing an existing death penalty statute
with a new death penalty statute.170
162. State v. Rust, 303 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Neb. 1981) (stating that the repeal statute “was not
enacted until after the sentence in this case had been imposed and became final. Having become a
final judgment prior to the effective date of [the repeal statute], it is not affected by the adoption of
[the statute].” (quoting State v. Holtan, 287 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Neb. 1980) (per curiam))).
163. People v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 1109, 1127 (Cal. 1989) (“Because defendant committed
the offenses when the [prior] law was in effect, that statute’s provisions governed the penalty
retrial. . . . A capital trial must be held under the death penalty law in effect at the time the capital
offenses were committed; application of any other law is error.”). But see id. (suggesting that the
result may be different if the subsequent law affected the “criminality of defendant’s conduct or the
severity of punishment” (emphasis added)).
164. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 267 (Tenn. 1994) (“[W]here an offense is committed
before the effective date of the [statute requiring the jury to find that aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances “beyond a reasonable doubt” before imposing a death sentence],
but the trial and sentencing occur after that effective date, a trial court does not err by instructing the
jury under the statute as it existed at the time the offense was committed.”); People v. Stankewitz,
793 P.2d 23, 47 (Cal. 1990) (stating that a statute requiring a jury to find that aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances before imposing a death sentence “was intended
to be purely prospective in effect” (citation omitted)).
165. Stankewitz, 793 P.2d at 47.
166. Simborski v. Wheeler, 183 A. 688, 689–90 (Conn. 1936).
167. State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 280 (Tenn. 1998).
168. State v. Ward, 555 S.E.2d 251, 260 (N.C. 2001).
169. Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 359 (Tex. 1968).
170. Watkins v. State, 409 So. 2d 901, 902–03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (“It is clear that the
legislature intended to apply [the] pre-existing [death penalty statute] to conduct occurring prior to
12:01 a.m. on July 1, 1981, and to apply [the new death penalty statute] to all conduct occurring on
and after that time and date.”); accord Ex parte Cochran, 500 So. 2d 1179, 1181 n.1 (Ala. 1985).
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Courts’ overwhelming refusal to give retroactive effect to prospectiveonly repeals of death penalty statutes is not a recent phenomenon; this has
been their consistent approach for over 100 years. In 1889, in the case of
People v. Nolan,171 the Court of Appeals of New York refused to give
retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute that replaced hanging with
electrocution.172 Rejecting the defendant’s argument that neither the old nor
the new statute applied to him, the court stated:
By reason of [the savings clause of the act,] the sections of the
Code as they existed prior to the passage of the act remain, for
all purposes therein stated, in full force and effect, exactly the
same as if no act of amendment, alteration, or repeal had ever
been passed; and on that account, and for that reason, the law
in force in this state, so far as the defendant is concerned,
remains as it was before [the date on which the act took
effect], and all its provisions relating to the infliction of the
death penalty by hanging are saved and continued. No amount
of reasoning or argument can make this plainer than it is made
by the statute itself, and further amplification would only tend
to confuse what is now clear and unambiguous.173
In 1908, in In re Schneck,174 the Kansas Supreme Court held that a statute
(like Connecticut’s) that completely repealed the death penalty prospectiveonly did not apply retroactively to a defendant who committed his offense
three months before repeal but who would not be tried until after repeal.175
According to the court,
[h]ad the Legislature in the enactment of the amendment
[repealing the death penalty] provided to what cases the
amendment should be applicable with reference to the time of
its passage, the special provision would control. In the
absence, however, of any such provision, the general [savings
statute] applies. . . .
. . . [S]ince the crime is charged to have been committed
before the repeal of the statute prescribing the penalty of
death, . . . the repeal and amendment does not affect the
penalty of the crime charged . . . .176
In 1918, in State v. Lewis,177 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that,
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

21 N.E. 1060 (N.Y. 1889).
Id. at 1062.
Id.
96 P. 43 (Kan. 1908).
Id. at 44–45.
Id.
201 S.W. 80 (Mo. 1918).
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pursuant to the state’s general savings statute, a 1917 statute completely
repealing the death penalty prospective-only (like Connecticut’s) did not
apply retroactively to a defendant who was sentenced to death three
months before passage of the repeal.178 “Undoubtedly the Legislature in
1917 had the power to abolish capital punishment as to all offenses,
whether committed before or after the enactment of the new law,” the court
stated, “but it did not do so.”179 And in 1927, in Ex parte Faltin,180 the
Supreme Court of Arizona refused to apply a 1916 prospective-only repeal
of the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree to a
defendant sentenced to death in 1913.181 “The old law is abrogated,
repealed and modified for future offenses,” the court concluded, “but
preserved by the [general] saving clause . . . in so far as the penalties to be
inflicted for offenses committed under it . . . .”182
As these cases demonstrate, courts that treat clearly prospective-only
death penalty repeals as such are not forging a new path. Instead, they are
standing on a long and well-worn road.
b. Cases Giving Retroactive Effect to Prospective-Only Repeal
Pursuant to Rules of Statutory Construction
While the overwhelming weight of authority rejects retroactive
application of death penalty repeals, some courts have applied such repeals
retroactively on the basis of statutory construction. They have done so in
two circumstances: (1) when the death penalty repeal was clearly
retroactive, thereby making resort to the general savings statute
unnecessary, or (2) when the death penalty repeal was silent or ambiguous
as to retroactivity and legislative history or fundamental fairness concerns
favored retroactive application over application of the general savings
statute.183 In both circumstances, courts have stopped short of disturbing
final judgments; as discussed above, these courts have interpreted death
178. Id. at 85–86; accord State v. Hill, 201 S.W. 58, 61 (Mo. 1918) (holding that the statute
abolishing death penalty, which became operative on June 18, 1917, did not apply where “trial and
conviction was had in May, 1917”).
179. Lewis, 201 S.W. at 85. Because Missouri’s general savings statute contained an exception
for ameliorative legislation enacted prior to “the penalty or punishment for any offense,” the Lewis
court suggested that the result might be different if the judgment and sentence had not been entered
before enactment of the repeal. Id. (quoting the ameliorative statute) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see id. at 85–86 (“[A]s the sentence and judgment in this case were prior to the going into
effect of the new statute, they were correct and in no way erroneous at the time of their entry, and
the new law . . . does not affect them in any way.”).
180. 254 P. 477 (Ariz. 1927).
181. Id. at 479–80.
182. Id. at 479.
183. A review of death penalty case law did not reveal a third circumstance in which courts
might otherwise apply repeals retroactively: application of an ameliorative amendment exception.
See supra text accompanying note 117 (discussing ameliorative amendment exception).
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penalty repeals to apply retroactively only to capital offenders who have
not exhausted their direct appeals.184
When the death penalty repeal is clearly retroactive as to crimes
committed before its effective date, thereby making the general savings
statute inapplicable, lower courts consistently give the statute retroactive
effect as a matter of statutory construction. For example, in Watts v.
State,185 the Supreme Court of Mississippi gave retroactive effect to a
statute requiring the jury to consider life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole as a sentencing option in “any case in which pre-trial,
trial or resentencing proceedings take place after July 1, 1994.”186 The fact
that the defendant’s crime occurred several months before the effective
date of the statute was “immaterial”; what mattered was that the defendant
was tried in 1996, “more than two years after the effective date of the
statute.”187
Similarly, in State v. Payne,188 the Idaho Supreme Court gave
retroactive effect to a statute that required new procedures for,
any capital sentencing proceeding occurring after the effective
date of this act, including those cases where the murder for
which sentence is to be imposed occurred before the effective
date of this act and including those cases where a first-degree
murder conviction or death sentence occurring before the
effective date of this act has been set aside and the case is
184. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing finality and statutory
retroactivity). Capital offenders who have not exhausted their direct appeals consist of those who
have not had their conviction and sentence reviewed by the state court of last resort (and by the U.S.
Supreme Court, assuming one of the parties petitions for a writ of certiorari and the Court grants the
petition). BARRY LATZER & JAMES N.G. CAUTHEN, JUSTICE DELAYED? TIME CONSUMPTION IN
CAPITAL APPEALS: A MULTISTATE STUDY 10–11 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/217555.pdf. Although the time it takes for a case to complete direct appeal differs
significantly from state to state, commentators report a median of 966 days from the date of
sentencing, or about 2.5 years, plus another 188–250 days for U.S. Supreme Court review of a
petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 3.
Following direct appeal, capital offenders can file a motion in the state trial court for state
post-conviction review of claims not raised on direct appeal. Id. at 11. They can also file a petition
for the writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Id. at 11–12. Both routes allow for the appeal
of adverse decisions and can take, roughly speaking, an additional ten years to resolve. Id. at 3, 9
(stating that it takes approximately three years from the date of sentencing to complete the direct
appeal process, and that it takes approximately twelve years from the date of sentencing to carry out
an execution). If a conviction or sentence is overturned in either post-conviction or habeas
proceedings, and the person is resentenced to death, the direct appeal process restarts. See id. at 9
n.1.
185. 733 So. 2d 214 (Miss. 1999).
186. Id. at 237 (quoting Act of Apr. 7, 1994, ch. 566, § 5, 1994 Miss. Laws. 847, 851)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Id.
188. 199 P.3d 123 (Idaho 2008).
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before the court for retrial or resentencing[] . . . .189
And in State v. Pace,190 the New Mexico Supreme Court gave retroactive
effect to a statute abolishing (with some exceptions for special
circumstances) the death penalty for murder and “provid[ing] for
revocation of death penalties already imposed and substitution of a
sentence of life imprisonment.”191 Because it was “clear from [the repeal
statute] that the legislature intended the act to apply retroactively,” the
court “perceive[d] no reason under the constitution why it could not make
the law applicable in situations where, as here, the case was pending on
appeal.”192
Rather than apply their general savings statute, some courts give
retroactive effect to ameliorative death penalty statutes that are ambiguous
or merely silent as to retroactivity. Legislative intent and fundamental
fairness figure prominently in these cases. For example, in 2004, in State v.
Fortin,193 the Supreme Court of New Jersey gave retroactive effect to a
2000 law that allowed a jury to consider life without parole as a sentencing
option in certain capital cases.194 “If the statute was not intended to apply
to capital murders that occurred before the enactment,” the court
acknowledged, “then the inquiry ends.”195 But the court found no such
intent. “[T]he language of the statute does not provide an answer [to the
question of whether the statute is retroactive] because the legislative
direction that the ‘act shall take effect immediately’ is insolubly
ambiguous.”196 Finding scant legislative history addressing the ambiguity,
the court concluded that “policy objectives of the legislation”—such as
eliminating recidivism and proportionality among defendants awaiting
sentencing—“clearly support the most far-reaching application of the
statute.”197
189. Id. at 154 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Act of Feb. 13, 2003, ch. 19, § 6, 2003 Idaho Sess.
Laws 71, 75).
190. 456 P.2d 197 (N.M. 1969).
191. Id. at 205 (per curiam) (supplemental opinion); see also Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The End
of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American Death Penalty Regime in the TwentyFirst Century, 90 OR. L. REV. 797, 821 (2012) (“Punishment by death for any crime is abolished
except for the crime of killing a police officer or prison or jail guard while in the performance of his
duties and except if the jury recommends the death penalty when the defendant commits a second
capital felony after the time for due deliberation following the commission of a capital felony.”
(quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2.1 (1963) (repealed 1973)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
192. Pace, 456 P.2d at 205. The court declined to consider whether the repeal also applied
retroactively to final death sentences. Id.
193. 843 A.2d 974 (N.J. 2004).
194. Id. at 1010, 1012.
195. Id. at 1012.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1012–13. After the reversal of his capital murder conviction and death sentence in
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In 1988, in State v. Bey,198 the Supreme Court of New Jersey gave
retroactive effect to a statute repealing the death penalty for crimes
committed by minors.199 In that case, New Jersey’s 1982 death penalty
statute was silent as to whether it applied to juveniles.200 When the
legislature amended the statute four years later to clarify that juveniles
were not included, it did not specify whether the amendment was
retroactive.201 The court relied on legislative history and other public
statements of legislators regarding the amendment’s intended retroactivity
to conclude that it was “clear . . . that the Legislature never had intended to
subject juvenile offenders to capital punishment [under the 1982 law], and
did intend that its ameliorative amendment [in 1986] would apply
retroactively to defendant’s case.”202 “[T]he presumption against
retroactive application,” the court added, “is no more than a rule of
statutory interpretation, and can be overcome by an indication of contrary
legislative intent, either expressed in the language of the statute itself, or
implied in its purpose.”203 In addition to legislative intent, the court stated
that “notions of fundamental fairness . . . likewise demand[ed] retroactive
application of the juvenile-offender exemption in this case.”204
2004, the defendant in Fortin was again convicted of capital murder. State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d
1133, 1134 (N.J. 2009). In 2007, prior to sentencing, the New Jersey legislature abolished the death
penalty and replaced it with life imprisonment without parole. Id. Because the state did “not dispute
that the Legislature clearly intended to retroactively apply the amended sentencing statute to
defendants who committed crimes prior to 2007,” id. at 1138, and instead moved to have the
defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, id. at 1136, the court never had to decide
whether New Jersey’s 2007 death penalty repeal was retroactive. See id. at 1138. Nor is it likely that
the court will do so since all of New Jersey’s remaining death row inmates had their sentences
commuted to life without parole. New Jersey, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-jersey-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014); see also infra note
270 (discussing New Jersey’s repeal statute).
198. 548 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1988).
199. Id. at 873, 877.
200. Id. at 872 (noting silence); id. at 873 (noting date of statute); id. at 872 n.29 (“Any person
convicted under subsection a. (1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct or
who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment,
of anything of pecuniary value shall be sentenced as provided hereafter . . . .”) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added); see id. at 874 (“[W]e cannot lightly presume that the ‘any person’
language was intended to sweep within its purview juveniles tried as adults.”).
201. Id. at 873 (“A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall not
be sentenced [to death].” (quoting Act of Jan. 17, 1986, ch. 478, § 1(g), 1985 N.J. Laws 1935,
1940)).
202. Id. at 873 & n.32 (noting that, at the time the statements were made, defendant “was the
only juvenile offender in New Jersey who had been convicted and sentenced to death”).
203. Id. at 876 (citation omitted) (quoting Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 499 (1974))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
204. Id. at 877 (noting that “the Attorney General . . . concedes that ‘sound public policy and
fundamental fairness dictate that defendant not be singled out to be the only juvenile ever executed
or even eligible for execution under our current death penalty law.’” (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Biegenwald, 524 A.2d 130, 157–58 (N.J. 1987) (giving
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In Cheatham v. State,205 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals gave
retroactive effect to a statute that required juries to consider the sentencing
option of life imprisonment without parole.206 The statute “bec[a]me
effective November 1, 1987,”207 but did not explicitly state that it was
retroactive. The court cited “the extreme nature of the penalty involved in
capital murder cases . . . [and] the need for extremely careful scrutiny of
the imposition of the death sentence,” and held that the statute applied in
that narrow band of cases in which the statute took effect while the
offender awaited trial.208 According to the court:
[S]entences of death must be absolutely, unquestionably fair.
Given the gravity of the death penalty, we find that
principals of fundamental fairness compel us to reverse this
case for a new second stage trial. . . . Quite simply, we cannot
justify a decision which would act as a total bar to
consideration of a punishment alternative to death merely
because the crime giving rise to the trial occurred a short time
before the effective date of . . . [the ameliorative] legislation.
. . . In the interests of fundamental fairness, we find that
justice demands the action taken by this Court under these
distinctively compelling facts.209
Similarly, in People v. Oliver,210 the Court of Appeals of New York gave
retroactive effect to a statute that, among other things, prohibited any child
retroactive effect to an ambiguous statutory amendment requiring the state to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, based on legislative history
and fundamental fairness, reasoning that “we would regard it as impermissibly harsh to apply to one
defendant, on this critical question of life and death, a standard significantly less favorable than that
to be applied to another defendant, merely because of the relatively short time differential between
the commission of their crimes. Much more is at stake than doing justice to [the defendant]. What is
at stake is the fundamental fairness of a system that generates life and death decisions”).
205. 900 P.2d 414 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
206. Id. at 429.
207. Act of May 18, 1987, ch. 96, § 7, 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 95, 96.
208. Cheatham, 900 P.2d at 429.
209. Id.; accord Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 739–41 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). The
majority’s reliance upon fundamental fairness in Cheatham and three factually analogous cases
prompted vigorous dissents by Judge Lumpkin. See Cheatham, 900 P.2d at 430 (Lumpkin, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Humphrey v. State, 864 P.2d 343, 345 (Okla. Crim. App.
1993) (Lumpkin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part ); Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744, 753–56
(Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (Lumpkin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 755
(“‘Principles of fundamental fairness’ is an easy solution to the problem this Court has created by
ignoring its own caselaw in determining ‘death is different.’ And as with many easy solutions, it is
neat, plausible—and wrong.”); Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 741–43 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993)
(Lumpkin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 743 (“Death is different; but law is law.
This Court in its ruling today stresses the former and ignores the latter. Nearly nine decades of
Oklahoma jurisprudence should have taught us better.”).
210. 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956).
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under fifteen from being charged with or prosecuted for a crime punishable
by death or life imprisonment.211 According to the court:
A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime
represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the
different treatment is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of
the criminal law. Nothing is to be gained by imposing the
more severe penalty after such a pronouncement; the excess in
punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to
satisfy a desire for vengeance.212
Therefore, the court concluded, “nothing but the very clearest legislative
direction should lead us to conclude that [the legislature] intended the prior
law to apply in any subsequent trial.”213 Because the statute contained “no
express instructions” as to its retroactivity, the court held that it applied
retroactively to those who, as in Cheatham, were “not tried and sentenced
by the time it became law.”214
Lastly, in People v. Kellick,215 the Illinois Supreme Court gave
retroactive effect to a statute that removed the aggravating factor under
which the defendant was charged with death.216 Although the statute was
ambiguous as to whether it was retroactive (its effective date preceded the
date it was signed into law), the court found “the legislative
history . . . replete with evidence that the General Assembly intended the
[amendment] to operate retrospectively.”217
211. Id. at 199, 202–04.
212. Id. at 202.
213. Id. at 204.
214. Id. at 202. Significantly, the court limited its holding to pending cases, noting “the settled
rule that, once final judgment has been pronounced, a change in the law does not arrest or interfere
with execution of the sentence.” Id. at 203 (quoting Welch v. Hudspeth, 132 F.2d 434, 436 (10th
Cir. 1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. (“[T]he construction that we are here according
to the amendment cannot be applied in favor of an offender tried and sentenced to imprisonment
before its enactment.”); id. (“Whenever the Legislature alters existing law, a certain measure of
inequality is bound to ensue.”); see also Mitchell, supra note 106, at 8 n.48, 47–51 (discussing state
savings statutes that contain exceptions allowing retroactive application of ameliorative legislation
in cases that are not final).
215. 464 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. 1984).
216. Id. at 1042–45. The repealing statute made a defendant eligible for a death sentence when
the defendant killed a child under twelve years of age—as opposed to sixteen years of age under the
former statute—in a particularly brutal or heinous fashion. Id. at 1043–44. The victim in Kellick
was fifteen years old. Id. at 1042.
217. Id. at 1043–45; see id. at 1045 (“Retroactive legislation is not favored, and as a general
rule statutes are construed to operate prospectively unless the legislative intent that they be given
retroactive operation clearly appears from the express language of the acts, or by necessary or
unavoidable implication.” (quoting U.S. Steel Credit Union v. Knight, 204 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1965))
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Interestingly, the court did not discuss Illinois’ ameliorative
amendment exception to its general savings clause, which states that “if any penalty, forfeiture or
punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of the
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3. Summary of Statutory Construction Analysis
As a matter of statutory construction, clearly prospective-only repeals of
death penalty legislation are not given retroactive effect. Likewise, clearly
retroactive repeals of death penalty legislation are given retroactive effect.
When repeals are silent or ambiguous as to whether they are prospectiveonly, most courts construe them as being prospective-only by resorting to
general savings statutes, which prohibit retroactive application of laws
absent contrary legislative intent. Some courts have applied ambiguous
repeals retroactively when legislative history or fundamental fairness
concerns favored retroactive application.
In the case of prospective-only death penalty repeal, then, the critical
legal question is not whether the legislature intended the law to apply
retroactively. It will most likely be clear from the repeal statute’s savings
clause—or from a state’s general savings statute as it applies to the
repeal—that the legislature did not intend the repeal to be retroactive, and
courts will respect such intent. Rather, the question is whether the
prospective-only law renders the sentences of people already on death row
unconstitutional. Although it is a familiar rule of statutory construction that
courts should not decide constitutional questions when a case does not
require it,218 there is no escaping those questions here. Prospective-only
death penalty repeal raises significant questions of constitutional law.
B. Prospective-Only Death Penalty Repeal Does Not Violate the
Eighth Amendment
The two most likely constitutional challenges to prospective-only repeal
are that it violates the Eighth Amendment (as applied to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment), and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses.219 This Article addresses the stronger
party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect.” 5 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 70/4 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-626 of 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Early cases likewise support the retroactive application of death penalty repeals that are
ambiguous as to retroactivity. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 418, 422–23 (1846)
(retroactively applying an ambiguous statute that abolished the death penalty for forgery because
the statute provided that, in lieu of death, “the person convicted”—not the person who shall be
convicted in the future—“shall be sentenced to be whipped thirty nine lashes”); Rex v. Davis,
(1785) 168 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B.); 1 Leach 271 (retroactively applying an ambiguous statute that
abolished the death penalty for killing deer), discussed in Comment, supra note 15, at 123.
218. E.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter.”).
219. Two other likely constitutional arguments are that prospective-only repeal violates the
Bill of Attainder Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl.
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of the two challenges: the Eighth Amendment. A companion article, From
Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The Fourteenth Amendment Case for Gradual
Abolition of the Death Penalty, addresses the equal protection and due
process arguments under the Fourteenth Amendment.220
There are three general types of Eighth Amendment challenges to the
death penalty: (1) the death penalty is invariably, or per se,
unconstitutional;221 (2) the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to a
particular defendant based on the character of the defendant’s crime or a
characteristic of the defendant;222 and (3) the death penalty is
unconstitutional as applied to a particular defendant based on the
procedures used to sentence the person to death.223 The issue of
prospective-only repeal is unique in that it raises questions under all three
types. While forceful, none of the Eighth Amendment arguments against
prospective-only repeal are winning ones. Indeed, only two cases have
struck down prospective-only death penalty repeal under the Eighth
Amendment or its state corollaries.224

1. For the sake of brevity, this Article will not give detailed treatment to these arguments, which are
unpersuasive. Nevertheless, some brief points are instructive. Bills of attainder are “legislative
acts . . . that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such
a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial.” United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 315 (1946), quoted with approval in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448–49 (1965);
see Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 (“[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was intended . . . as an implementation
of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against . . . trial by legislature.”). Prospective-only
death penalty repeal is not a bill of attainder because it does not apply to a particular group of
people; it applies to crimes committed before its effective date (assuming the effective date turns on
the date of the crime, as in Connecticut and New Mexico). Although people currently on death row
remain eligible for death, so do those who committed a capital crime prior to repeal but have not yet
been charged (e.g., “cold cases”), convicted, or sentenced. Prospective-only repeal therefore applies
to more than just those currently on death row. More importantly, prospective-only repeal does not
inflict punishment without a judicial trial; it preserves punishment after a judicial trial. For these
reasons, prospective-only death penalty repeal does not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause.
Prospective-only repeal also does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it does not “make[]
more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment”; it merely preserves intact
the punishment in existence at the time the crime was committed. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,
435 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 36 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (2010), and Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Collins, 497 U.S. 37);
see id. at 430 (“[W]e have recognized that central to the ex post facto prohibition is a concern for
the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond
what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
220. See Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra note 1.
221. CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 25–26.
222. Id. at 26–32.
223. Id. at 22–24.
224. See infra Subsection III.B.2.c (discussing the Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989)
and Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) cases).
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1. Unconstitutional Per Se
In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia225 and its four companion cases,226 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the death penalty was per se
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).227 The Court
answered this question in the negative and upheld three of the five statutes,
all of which attempted to alleviate the arbitrariness in sentencing that had
led the court to effectively invalidate the death penalty nationwide just four
years earlier in the case of Furman v. Georgia.228 Relying in part on the
fact that a staggering thirty-five states had reenacted death penalty statutes
in the four years since Furman,229 and on the acceptability of the death
penalty’s
penological
goals—retribution,
deterrence,
and
incapacitation230—the Court held both that “the punishment of death does
not invariably violate the Constitution” and that it “is not a form of
punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of
the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of
the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it.”231
The Eighth Amendment argument against prospective-only repeal is, in
effect, an argument that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional.
Accordingly, it should fail under Gregg. Those who remain on death row
do not share a common characteristic or crime putting them in a class that
the Supreme Court considers ineligible for the death penalty: they are not
insane,232 they are not minors,233 they do not have an intellectual
disability,234 and they have all committed crimes involving the taking of a
life.235 They are, quite literally, “everyone else.” Their only similarity is
that, because of prospective-only repeal, they face the death penalty and all
225. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
226. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
227. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162 (plurality opinion).
228. Compare id. at 207 (holding that the death penalty was not unconstitutional per se and
upholding the Georgia death penalty statute as applied in that case), Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242
(upholding the Florida death penalty statute as applied in that case), and Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276
(upholding the Texas death penalty statute as applied in that case), with Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the death penalty was unconstitutional as
applied). In two companion cases to Gregg, the Court struck down two statutes that made the
imposition of the death penalty mandatory for first-degree murder. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305
(striking down the North Carolina death penalty statute); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336 (striking down
the Louisiana death penalty statute).
229. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–80.
230. Id. at 183 & n.28.
231. Id. at 169, 187.
232. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
233. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
234. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
235. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008).
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others do not. But the effective date of a statute, without more, is not a
meaningful basis for establishing a constitutionally protected class immune
from the death penalty. Indeed, it would be the height of irony if, in
attempting to maintain the status quo for those on death row, legislators
created a catch-all class protected from the death penalty by repealing it
prospectively.
An argument against applying the death penalty to the unprotected
remainder is therefore an argument that the death penalty cannot be
imposed at all, against anyone. While the Supreme Court has “insist[ed]
upon confining the instances in which [capital] punishment can be
imposed” in recent years,236 it has never retreated from Gregg’s reasoning
that the death penalty is constitutional, provided that “the circumstances of
the offense,” “the character of the offender,” and “the procedure followed
in reaching the decision to impose [the death penalty]” pass muster.237
None of these caveats are at issue here. It is one thing to say that the death
penalty cannot be imposed against any person on death row with an
intellectual disability, for example, but quite another to say it cannot be
imposed against any person on death row—full stop. This would
effectively strike down death sentences post-repeal, in contradiction of
Gregg.
2. Unconstitutional as Applied: Atkins and Its Progeny
Since Gregg’s rejection of the argument that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se, most constitutional challenges to the death penalty
have contested the excessiveness of the death penalty as applied to
particular classes of defendants and crimes.238 In 2002, for example, in
Atkins v. Virginia,239 the Supreme Court held that it was cruel and unusual
to execute a person with an intellectual disability (referred to by the Court
as “mental retardation”).240 In its opinion, the Court’s majority articulated a
two-prong test to determine whether a punishment is excessive as applied
to particular classes of defendants and crimes.241
In conducting this two-prong inquiry into the excessiveness of the death
penalty, the Court is guided not by the standards that prevailed “when the
Bill of Rights was adopted,” or some other time in the past, but rather by
“those that currently prevail”; that is, the Court is guided by “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”242 In
determining whether the death penalty, as applied, is inconsistent with
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 420.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion).
CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 26.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 321.
Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 311–12.
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evolving standards of decency, the Court first looks to “objective evidence
of contemporary values.”243 This evidence includes jury verdicts as well as
“the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures,” which is “the
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.”244
But “objective evidence, though of great importance, d[oes] not ‘wholly
determine’ the controversy,”245 even if it evinces a “national consensus.”246
In the end, the Constitution requires that the Court bring its “own
judgment . . . to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”247 The court must determine
“whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the
citizenry and its legislators.”248
This second prong of the test is subjective.249 In exercising its own
judgment, the Court considers whether the death penalty “measurably
contributes”250 to one or both of “two distinct social purposes served by the
death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders.”251 Retribution is “the interest in seeing that the offender gets his
‘just deserts’”252 for the “hurt he caused”;253 it is an expression of the
“community’s moral outrage,” “an attempt to right the balance for the
wrong to the victim.”254 “[C]ulpability or blameworthiness”255—the
offender’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt”256—figure prominently
into the Court’s analysis.257 If an offender is less blameworthy, as in the
243. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other
grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. Id. (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The jury also is a significant and reliable
objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.”); see also id. at 175
(“[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people.” (alteration in original) (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
245. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
246. See id. at 312–13; see also, e.g., id. at 314 (using the phrase “national consensus”)
247. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597) (internal quotation marks omitted).
248. Id. at 313.
249. See id. at 312.
250. Id. at 319 (“Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded person
‘measurably contributes’ to one or both of these goals, it is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punishment.” (quoting
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
251. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
252. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
253. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008).
254. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 571 (majority opinion); id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Atkins, 536
U.S. at 319 (“[T]he severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of
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case of a minor or a person with intellectual disabilities, that person is not
“the most deserving of execution” and, therefore, retribution is sufficiently
served by a less severe punishment.258
Deterrence, on the other hand, is “the interest in preventing capital
crimes by prospective offenders.”259 As the Court notes, “[t]he theory of
deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the
increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from
carrying out murderous conduct.”260 “Although some . . . studies suggest
that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent
than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence either
supporting or refuting this view,” and the Court accepts that “there are
murderers . . . for whom . . . . the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant
deterrent.”261 The Court requires at a minimum, though, that future
offenders have the capacity to “process the information of the possibility of
execution as a penalty and . . . control their conduct based upon that
information.”262
“Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a [prisoner] measurably
contributes to one or both of these goals, it is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an
unconstitutional punishment.”263
In Atkins, the Court credited “the large number of States prohibiting the
execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions)” as
evincing a “national consensus” against executing people with intellectual
disabilities.264 While thirty states prohibited the execution of people with
intellectual disabilities, the Court noted that “[i]t is not so much the
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the

the offender.”).
258. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (“[C]apital punishment must
be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose
extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.” (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at
568)).
259. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
260. Id. at 320.
261. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185–86 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted),
quoted in Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 440–41; accord Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
262. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
263. Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Atkins, suggested a third social purpose
earlier recognized by the Court: “incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the consequent
prevention of crimes that they may otherwise commit in the future.” Id. at 350 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 n.28); see id. (noting that the majority “conveniently
ignores [this] third ‘social purpose’ of the death penalty”).
264. Id. at 315–16 (“The practice, therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that
a national consensus has developed against it.”).
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direction of change.”265 This national consensus, together with the Court’s
own judgment that retribution and deterrence were not served by executing
a person with reduced cognitive capacity and therefore reduced culpability,
led the Court to hold the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to
people with intellectual disabilities.266
Employing Atkins’ two-part analysis, the Court subsequently struck
down the death penalty in two other cases: the first involving children who
were under 18 at the time of the offense,267 and the second involving
crimes that do not take the life of the victim.268 One might argue that
prospective-only repeal is unconstitutional as applied to those currently on
death row because it is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency.
This argument is unavailing in light of the Supreme Court’s two-pronged
test under Atkins and its progeny.
a. There Is No National Consensus Against Prospective-Only
Repeal
This subsection analyzes state legislation for indications of national
consensus regarding prospective-only repeal. Exploring several avenues for
comparing states’ application of repeal legislation, it finds, at best, an even
split, and concludes that there is no consensus against prospective-only
repeal of the death penalty.
i. “45:3”
Thirty-two states retain the death penalty.269 Because the legislatures in
these states support the death penalty, it seems far-fetched to think that they
would object to prospective-only repeal because it leaves in place the
sentences of those on death row. Retentionist states like the death penalty,
and it is therefore safe to assume that they would find a decision to
maintain the state’s death row intact post-repeal to be a rather reasonable
compromise—not beyond the pale. In fact, if any of these thirty-two states
were to object to prospective-only repeal, it would most likely be for the
opposite reason—that the death penalty should not be repealed for anyone,
let alone those currently on death row.
265. Id. at 315; Entzeroth, supra note 191, at 815 (noting that “eighteen death penalty states
and twelve non-death-penalty states prohibited the death penalty against mentally retarded
offenders”).
266. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20 (“If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to
justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally
retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. . . . [I]t is the same cognitive and
behavioral impairments that make these defendants less morally culpable . . . that also make it less
likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a
result, control their conduct based upon that information.”).
267. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
268. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008).
269. States with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 59.
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The eighteen states (plus the District of Columbia) that have abolished
the death penalty provide little support for a national consensus against
prospective-only repeal. Only three of these states, West Virginia, North
Dakota, and New Jersey, unambiguously abolished the death penalty
retroactively,270 while three other states, New Mexico, Connecticut, and
270. See Act of Dec. 17, 2007, ch. 204, § 2, 2007 N.J. Laws 1427, 1429–30, available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/PL07/204_.PDF (“An inmate sentenced to death prior to the
date of the enactment of this act, upon motion to the sentencing court and waiver of any further
appeals related to sentencing, shall be resentenced to a term of life imprisonment during which the
defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Such sentence shall be served in a maximum security
prison. Any such motion to the sentencing court shall be made within 60 days of the enactment of
this act. If the motion is not made within 60 days the inmate shall remain under the sentence of
death previously imposed by the sentencing court.”); Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 63, § 1, 1915 N.D.
Laws 76, 76 (“Every person who has been or may be hereafter convicted of murder in the first
degree shall be punished by confinement at hard labor in the State Penitentiary for life.” (emphasis
added)); Act of Mar. 12, 1965, ch. 40, 1965 W. Va. Acts 203, 207 (“[N]o person . . . shall be
executed, irrespective of whether the crime was committed, the conviction had, or the sentence
imposed, before or after the enactment of this section.”). Although the intent of the legislatures in
each of these states was clearly to abolish all death sentences—both final and not yet final—it is not
clear that repeals of final sentences, if challenged, would withstand scrutiny under separation-ofpowers principles. Although important, this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
One might reasonably argue that New Jersey’s repeal was not truly retroactive because it did
not simply convert all death sentences to life without parole (LWOP), but rather required inmates
on death row to file a court motion and waive further appeals before being resentenced to LWOP.
Cf. Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 6 (listing only two states, North Dakota and West Virginia, as
having explicitly retroactive legislation). This argument has merit. Nevertheless, because New
Jersey’s repeal explicitly provided for resentencing death row inmates to LWOP upon fulfilment of
certain non-onerous conditions, and because the decision to resentence was to be automatic—not
discretionary—the stronger argument is that New Jersey’s repeal was retroactive, albeit less
straightforward than North Dakota’s or West Virginia’s repeals. Indeed, in a case that indirectly
raised this question, New Jersey’s State’s Attorney did “not dispute that the Legislature clearly
intended to retroactively apply the amended sentencing statute to defendants who committed crimes
prior to [the 2007 repeal].” State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d 1133, 1138 (N.J. 2009). The fact that New
Jersey’s governor preemptively commuted the sentences of those on death row immediately prior to
repeal—effectively mooting the repeal’s retroactive language—does not alter this conclusion. See
New Jersey, supra note 197. Lawyers for inmates on New Jersey’s death row objected to the repeal
statute’s requirement that inmates waive any further appeals on grounds that it was unconstitutional
as applied to those who were still contesting guilt and thus punishment. Out of concern that a court
would invalidate this provision, thereby leaving those on death row where they sat, Governor
Corzine commuted the sentences of those on death row. Email to author (Apr. 15, 2013) (source
confidential at request of interviewee; notes on file with author); see also New Jersey, supra note
197. Further, although New Jersey’s death penalty repeal was not explicitly retroactive as to inmates
awaiting sentencing, this was strongly implied, as conceded by the State in Fortin, 969 A.2d at
1138.
“In 1915, North Dakota [retroactively] abolished the death penalty [for all but] two crimes:
treason and murder committed by an inmate already serving a life sentence.” North Dakota, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/north-dakota-0 (last visited Feb. 28,
2014). When North Dakota completely abolished its death penalty in 1973, it did so prospectiveonly. See Act of Mar. 15, 1973, ch. 116, §§ 1, 41, 1973 N.D. Laws 215, 216, 300 (replacing the old
criminal code with a new criminal code without the death penalty and providing that the new code
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Maryland, went the other way—unambiguously abolishing the death
penalty prospective-only.271
Of the remaining twelve abolitionist states, Massachusetts and New
York (and the District of Columbia) did not abolish the death penalty
legislatively. Instead, they did so through judicial action (i.e., striking down
the death penalty on constitutional grounds) coupled with legislative
inaction (i.e., failing to resurrect the death penalty).272 Because legislatures
and, to a lesser extent, juries (not courts) are the best indicator of evolving
standards, these two states and the District of Columbia neither support nor
undermine a national consensus against prospective-only repeal. As a
result, they should be excluded from the tally.
The remaining ten abolitionist states passed statutes that were silent, or
ambiguous at best, as to retroactivity.273 These states should be considered
to be supportive of prospective-only repeal for the following reasons: First,
as discussed above, in states with general savings statutes, there is a
presumption against retroactive application of statutes unless the repeal
statute explicitly states otherwise, as was the case in West Virginia, North
Dakota, and New Jersey.274 Because all ten states appear to have had
general savings statutes at the time of repeal, any ambiguity would have
been construed against retroactivity.275 Second, in four states with people
“shall not apply to offenses committed prior to its effective date. Prosecutions for such offenses
shall be governed by prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose”); Rodney S. Webb, A
Prosecutor Looks at the Criminal Code, 50 N.D. L. REV. 631, 631, 633 (1974) (similar).
271. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
272. See Massachusetts, supra note 59; New York, supra note 59; District of Columbia, supra
note 59.
273. Those ten states are Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 3–5 (compiling abolition
statutes); id. at 6 (suggesting that statutes in those ten states were silent or ambiguous); see also
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.25 (1988) (compiling abolition statutes).
274. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
275. See Mitchell, supra note 106, at 47–51 (compiling savings statutes, but excluding
Minnesota, among others); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.35 (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Special
Sess.) (Minnesota savings statute); accord Ruud, supra note 76, at 296 & n.54; Comment, supra
note 15, at 127–28 & nn.51–52. In his 1955 article discussing state savings statutes, Professor
Millard H. Ruud noted that the “general statistical data presented here are based upon an
examination of the available statutes and not upon a study of all the statutory and case law on the
subject in each state,” and is therefore “sufficiently,” but perhaps not “completely” accurate. Ruud,
supra, at 76 n.54. The same caveat applies here. For example, it is not clear when Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Vermont enacted their savings statutes, so it is difficult to know whether their
statutes were in effect at the time of repeal. Likewise, although Iowa and Vermont have adopted
ameliorative amendment exceptions to their general savings statutes, thereby giving retroactive
effect to ameliorative legislative changes, it is not clear whether these amendments were in effect at
the time of repeal. (Illinois’ ameliorative amendment exception was clearly in effect at the time of
its repeal in 2011.) Even assuming that these ameliorative amendments were in effect at the time of
repeal, they would have applied only to pre-final judgment defendants, not to those already on
death row, thereby “resulting in a limited number of defendants being eligible to receive the
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on death row at the time of repeal, governors (or, in one state, the Board of
Pardons) commuted those death sentences immediately after, or in
anticipation of, repeal—proof positive that the repeals were not
retroactive.276 If they had been retroactive, there would have been no death
sentences to commute. And finally, even if these states’ repeals were
interpreted to apply retroactively, such an interpretation would most likely
have extended only to capital offenders whose sentences had not yet
become final.277 Absent language like North Dakota’s, West Virginia’s, or
New Jersey’s, these statutes do not evince an intent to abolish the death
penalty for all capital offenders.
This means that a total of forty-five states (thirty-two retentionist plus
thirteen abolitionist—three of which were clearly prospective-only)
support prospective-only repeal; three do not. In Roper and Atkins, the
Court held that thirty states’ rejection of the death penalty for juvenile
offenders and people with intellectual disabilities, respectively, constituted
a consensus against the death penalty.278 Here the complete opposite is
true: well over thirty states support prospective-only repeal. This is not
evidence of a consensus against prospective-only repeal and, in fact,
strongly suggests consensus for it.
ii. “13:3”
The Court’s majority, when surveying the actions of legislatures to
discern evolving standards of decency, includes all states in their tally,
those that have abolished the death penalty as well as those that have
not.279 That same reasoning applies here; evolving standards of decency
regarding prospective-only repeal should be gauged by looking at both
retentionist and abolitionist states. As noted above, this reasoning yields a
strong majority of states—forty-five—in favor of prospective-only repeal,
and only three against it.
benefits of an ameliorative sentencing change.” Mitchell, supra note 106, at 20; see supra notes
117–18 and accompanying text (noting that courts have not interpreted ameliorative amendments
to apply retroactively to final sentences). Because the repeals in Iowa, Vermont, and Illinois were,
at best, only partially retroactive—as opposed to those in North Dakota, West Virginia, and New
Jersey, which were complete—these three states should be counted as supporting prospective-only
repeal.
276. See Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 3 nn.5–7, 4 nn.11–12 (discussing prospective-only
repeals and commutations in Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota with the commutations in Iowa
and Minnesota occurring before repeal).
277. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting that state courts have interpreted death
penalty repeals to apply retroactively only to capital offenders who have not exhausted their direct
appeals).
278. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (counting thirty states and noting that
Atkins involved thirty states as well); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008)
(noting that forty-five states’ rejection of the death penalty for child rape constituted significant
evidence of the national consensus against the practice).
279. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
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But perhaps including retentionist states in the tally is improper in this
context. The fact that thirty-two states retain the death penalty, one might
argue, tells us that the death penalty is popular—not that prospective-only
repeal is popular. As Justice Scalia has reasoned in a slightly different
death penalty context, the fact that thirty-two states favor executions says
something about consensus for the death penalty, but nothing—“absolutely
nothing”—about consensus that those on death row should remain on
death row after prospective-only repeal of the death penalty.280
When the thirty-two retentionist states are left out of the tally, thirteen
abolitionist states have statutorily abolished the death penalty prospectiveonly (three of them explicitly), while three others have abolished the death
penalty retroactively. Stated another way, approximately 19% of the
abolitionist states that have statutorily abolished their death penalties (three
out of sixteen) opposed prospective-only repeal. That percentage falls well
short of the 47% of retentionist states that opposed the execution of minors
and people with intellectual disabilities at the time of Roper and Atkins,
and which the Court used to support finding the death penalty
unconstitutional in both cases.281 Furthermore, as the Court’s majority has
repeatedly stated, “It is not so much the number of . . . States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”282 The four
most recent states to repeal the death penalty legislatively, New Mexico
(2009), Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), and Maryland (2013), all did
so through prospective-only statutes.283 The direction of change thus points
unmistakably toward prospective-only repeal, evincing a trend in favor of
the practice or, as Justice Alito might say, perhaps “the beginning of a new
evolutionary line.”284
280. See id. at 610–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Consulting States that bar the death penalty
concerning the necessity of making an exception to the penalty for offenders under 18 is rather like
including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric car. Of course they
don’t like it, but that sheds no light whatever on the point at issue.”).
281. See id. at 564 (majority opinion) (noting that eighteen of thirty-eight retentionist states
prohibited execution of juveniles and individuals with intellectual disabilities); see also id. at 562
(citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–71 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Roper,
543 U.S. 551, for the proposition that twelve out of thirty-seven retentionist states’ prohibition of
execution of people who were seventeen at the time of the offense—or approximately 32% of all
retentionist states—was not sufficient to constitute a national consensus against such executions);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989),
abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, for the proposition that two out of thirty-six
retentionist states’ prohibition of execution of individuals with intellectual disabilities—or
approximately 6% of all retentionist states—was not sufficient to constitute a national consensus
against such executions).
282. E.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 63–66.
284. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 455 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting). However, in
Kennedy, the Court held that “six new death penalty statutes, three enacted in the last two years” did
not “reflect a consistent direction of change in support of the death penalty for child rape.” Id. at
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iii. “3:3”
When the six states to have explicitly addressed prospective-only repeal
are looked at in isolation—North Dakota (1915), West Virginia (1965),
New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), Connecticut (2012), and
Maryland (2013)—the percentage of abolitionist states opposing
prospective-only repeal increases to 50%; three for prospective-only repeal
(New Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland), and three against (North
Dakota, West Virginia, and New Jersey).285 Here, too, the direction of
change is significant. In the past five years, no state has repealed the death
penalty retroactively and prospectively; rather, three states have explicitly
repealed the death penalty prospective-only. At best, these numbers
demonstrate no consensus—for or against—prospective-only repeal.
iv. “0:50”
The fact that four states (New Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut, and
Maryland) in the past five years—and thirteen states in U.S. jurisprudential
history—have abolished the death penalty prospective-only, one might
argue, obscures the fact that not one offender has apparently ever been
executed after prospective-only repeal.286 In Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, and New Jersey, for example, the governor or board of pardons
commuted the sentences of those on death row in anticipation of or
immediately following prospective-only repeal.287 In many other
abolitionist states, commutation was not necessary because there appears to
have been no one on death row at the time of repeal.288 Because apparently
no state has ever executed a person on death row post-repeal, one might
reasonably argue that New Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland, all of
which have preserved their death rows intact post-repeal, are an anomaly
among abolitionist states—not a new evolutionary line entitled to respect.
431–32. This was because the recent trend in favor of the death penalty for child rape was
counterbalanced by the total number of states—a whopping forty-four plus the federal
government—that had recognized the impropriety of the practice. See id. at 423, 426, 431–33. In
the prospective-only context, there is no inconsistency between past and present; the recent trend in
favor of prospective-only repeals matches the historical trend of prospective-only repeals among
states.
285. See supra notes 2–3, 60 and accompanying text.
286. Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 1, 10.
287. Id. at 3 nn.5–7, 4 nn.11–12. Contra id. at 5 (mentioning Iowa).
288. See supra note 1 (arguing that the dearth of case law addressing challenges to
prospective-only repeals suggests that there was no one on death row in some abolitionist states).
See generally Historian’s Brief, supra note 1, at 3–5 (noting that five executives commuted death
sentences immediately before or after repeal, and that there is no record of executions being carried
out after repeal). Further research into abolitionist states’ death row populations is needed in order
to distinguish states in which commutation was not needed because there simply was no one on
death row at the time of repeal, from states that had inmates on death row at the time of repeal but
refused to sign death warrants.
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While this argument has considerable merit, it fails for two reasons.
First, consensus about prospective-only repeal is not principally amassed
from the whim of boards of pardon and outgoing governors. As the Court
has repeatedly stated, it is the country’s legislatures (and, to a lesser extent,
juries) that are the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values,” not its executive officials.289 Although “review of
national consensus is not confined to tallying the number of States with
applicable death penalty legislation,” and therefore includes “[s]tatistics
about the number of executions,” it is legislation that matters most.290 In
Kennedy, for example, the infrequent execution of people convicted of
child rape “confirm[ed]” the consensus of forty-five jurisdictions with
statutes prohibiting the practice.291 In Roper and Atkins, the infrequent
execution of juveniles and people with intellectual disabilities,
respectively, supported the consensus of thirty jurisdictions with statutes
prohibiting the practice.292 Thus, while execution statistics may support a
strong demonstration of national consensus as expressed by the acts of the
legislature, or “counterbalance an otherwise weak demonstration of
[national] consensus”293 as expressed by the acts of the legislature, they do
not substitute for the acts of the legislation. Four states in the past five
years, and a majority of all abolitionist states through death penalty history,
have abolished the death penalty prospective-only.294 To exalt the
infrequency of post-repeal executions over the frequency of legislation
repealing the death penalty prospective-only would make execution
statistics the tail that wags the dog of national consensus.
Second, giving undue import to execution statistics is particularly
inappropriate in the context of prospective-only repeal. Because
establishing the effective date of a statute uniquely implicates the
289. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2012) (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other
grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304)); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (stating that
“objective indicia of consensus [are] expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that
have addressed the question” (emphasis added)); accord Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 422 (“The existence
of objective indicia of consensus . . . was a relevant concern in Roper, [and] Atkins . . . and we
follow the approach of those cases here.”).
290. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426, 433; cf. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 323 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(stating that “the actions of sentencing juries[ are] entitled to less weight than legislative
judgments”).
291. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433–34 (confirmation); id. at 426 (forty-five jurisdictions).
292. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16.
293. Cf. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 431 (noting that the consistent change in direction of legislative
support for the death penalty of child rapists “might counterbalance an otherwise weak
demonstration of consensus” (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315)); Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66 (same).
294. See supra Subsection III.B.2.a.i–ii (noting the four recent prospective-only repeals and
arguing that thirteen states had prospective-only statutory repeals out of sixteen states with statutory
repeals).
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lawmaking function, legislatures are not simply the best source for gauging
the propriety of prospective-only repeal. They are, in fact, the only source.
Setting effective dates of legislation (as opposed to considering culpability
or other mitigating factors post-sentencing) is not the province of the
executive. Legislatures have the discretion to preserve death sentences
post-repeal,295 and governors and boards of pardon have “virtually
unfettered discretion” to commute those sentences post-repeal.296
Executive officials’ decisions to exercise their discretion (by commuting
sentences) do not render legislatures’ decisions to exercise their own
discretion (by passing prospective-only laws) unconstitutional. For this
reason, it is a mistake to conclude that consensus has evolved against
prospective-only repeal based on the absence of people on death row in
most abolitionist states.
Atkins and its progeny support this reasoning. In determining whether
there was a national consensus against the execution of people with
intellectual disabilities, the Court did not scrutinize whether certain states
abolished prospective-only, let alone whether the executive in certain states
commuted sentences after prospective-only repeal.297 As Atkins
demonstrates, it is the legislative act of prospective-only repeal that is of
primary importance in determining consensus—not the subsequent actions
of the executive.
b. Prospective-Only Repeal Furthers Retribution and Deterrence
Both retribution and deterrence are served by prospective-only repeal,
which leaves intact the sentences of those already on death row. That such
repeals serve only one of these goals is all the Constitution requires.298
As for retribution, consider again the words of Connecticut state
295. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (“The deference we owe to the decisions
of the state legislatures under our federal system is enhanced where the specification of punishments
is concerned, for these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 465–70 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))).
296. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 292 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] State . . . unquestionably may allow the executive
virtually unfettered discretion in determining the merits of appeals for mercy.”).
297. Compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–15 (compiling legislation abolishing the death penalty
for people with intellectual disabilities), with id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Not 18 States, but
only 7—18% of death penalty jurisdictions—have legislation [forbidding all executions of
individuals with intellectual disabilities]. Eleven of those that the Court counts enacted statutes
prohibiting execution of mentally retarded defendants convicted after, or convicted of crimes
committed after, the effective date of the legislation; those already on death row, or consigned there
before the statute’s effective date, or even (in those States using the date of the crime as the criterion
of retroactivity) tried in the future for murders committed many years ago, could be put to death.”
(footnote omitted)).
298. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (stating that the death penalty must “measurably contribute[]
to one or both of these goals” (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982))).
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Senator Edith Prague, who voted for prospective repeal in part to ensure
that those responsible for the home invasion and triple murder in Cheshire,
Connecticut would remain on death row. “They should bypass the trial,”
Senator Prague stated, “and take that second animal and hang him by his
penis from a tree out in the middle of Main Street.”299 Although the eleven
offenders in Connecticut will not die in so cruel a fashion as envisaged by
Senator Prague, the result will be the same—they will get their just deserts;
they will be executed, or they will die of old age waiting for that fate. The
same can be said for the five men who remain on Maryland’s death row
and the two men who remain on New Mexico’s death row post-repeal.
Culpability, moreover, has absolutely no role to play in this context.
Unlike youth and disability, which render one less deserving of death,
prospective-only repeal does not reduce an offender’s blameworthiness.
“[T]he severity of the appropriate punishment,” the Supreme Court has
stated, “necessarily depends on the culpability”—not the good fortune—
“of the offender.”300 Those who remain on death row post-repeal are
unlucky, to be sure, but not less culpable.
A counter-argument is that prospective-only repeal of the death penalty
is somehow equivalent to a rejection of the retributive value of the death
penalty. This argument has two significant faults. The first is the
assumption that death penalty repeal necessarily calls into question the
legitimacy of retribution. As the Court stated in the context of civil
remedies in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, “Statutes are seldom crafted to
pursue a single goal.”301 The reasons for legislative action are many and
varied; they are a dense manifold. This is no less true in the death penalty
context. There are many reasons to repeal the death penalty prospectiveonly, such as avoiding cost,302 preventing false hopes for victims,303 and
299. State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566, 696 (Conn. 2012) (Harper, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Sen. Prague) (internal quotation marks omitted).
300. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. The Court gives no consideration to the fortuity of statutory
changes.
301. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994).
302. Lawmakers may rationally seek to avoid the cost of procuring new death sentences while
maintaining existing death sentences won at significant cost. See CT’s January 2013 Response,
supra note 78, at 30 (noting “the enormous time, expense and consumption of state resources it
takes to prosecute a capital case” as reason to repeal); NM’s January 2011 Response, supra note 3,
at 11 (noting the “perceived high cost of death penalty litigation” as a “reason for repealing the
death penalty”); cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 458–59 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(discussing state legislatures’ refusal to pass new capital child-rape laws because of “high
associated costs” (quoting Tavia D. Green, Small Victory in Big Fight for Tougher Sex Abuse Laws,
LEAF-CHRON. (May 8, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 26988729) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Krent, supra note 106, at 83 (“[L]egislatures may reduce the penalties for particular
crimes, not because of changed circumstances or views of the wrongfulness of the underlying
conduct, but for instrumental reasons due to the rising cost of incarceration . . . . Such decisions to
ameliorate punishment do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that those previously convicted
also should have their punishments reduced. A rational legislature could conclude that the social or
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eliminating the risk of executing the innocent.304 Such reasons do not call
the legitimacy of retribution into question. Indeed, if a legislature believes
that the death penalty serves no legitimate retributive purpose, it can
amend the constitution or abolish the death penalty prospectively and
retroactively. Legislatures that repeal prospective-only have deliberately
chosen not to do either of these things. Prospective-only repeal is therefore
not necessarily a rejection of the death penalty’s retributive value—a
determination “that the death penalty is intolerable under any and all
circumstances.”305 It is not, as Justice Scalia has stated, “a statement of
absolute moral repugnance, but one of current preference between two
[constitutionally] tolerable approaches”: to keep the death penalty for some
or abolish it altogether.306
The second fault is that, even assuming prospective-only death penalty
repeal is equivalent to a rejection of the retributive value of the death
penalty, it is not a complete rejection. It is constitutionally tolerable for a
legislature to reject the retributive value of the death penalty going forward
but not going backward. A legislature that has come to doubt the retributive
value of the death penalty may repeal it for future offenders whose
“unidentified and unidentifiable victims . . . live under an altered social
contract.”307 At the same time, a legislature may retain it for those who
stand outside this “veil of ignorance”—those offenders who were on notice
at the time they committed their crimes that death was the punishment, and
whose victims are known and now gone.308
Although retribution seems clear enough in this context, deterrence is a
other benefits of the lightened punishment are more important with respect to those sentenced in the
future than those sentenced in the past.”).
303. Lawmakers may rationally believe in the state’s capacity to keep its “promise” to victims
in existing death penalty cases while doubting its capacity to do so in the future.
304. Lawmakers may rationally believe that no one currently on death row is innocent but seek
to avoid the potential for error in the future. Cf. 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (“[T]here is
no one on death row [in Connecticut] who is innocent and . . . there is nothing that could ultimately
ever prove their innocence.”).
305. State v. Rizzo, 31 A.3d 1094, 1167 n.88 (Conn. 2011).
306. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); cf.
Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 664 (1974) (rejecting argument that, by passing a prospectiveonly statute removing parole ineligibility, Congress “jettison[ed] the retributive approach of the
[repealed] law,” and finding no constitutional infirmity in the statute’s prospective-only
application), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481, 88
Stat. 1455, 1455; Krent, supra note 106, at 81 (stating that, “in the Legislature's eyes,” crimes
committed before passage of ameliorative legislation “may ‘merit’ different punishment” than
identical crimes committed after such legislation because of changed factual circumstances as
opposed to morality”).
307. CT’s January 2013 Response, supra note 78, at 31.
308. Cf. Krent, supra note 106, at 79–80 (“The fact that norms later change in no way
undermines the conclusion that the individual knowingly (depending on the mens rea required)
violated a rule of the community. . . . Congress rationally could treat those who knowingly violated
a social command differently from those who did not, even though the conduct was the same.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

61

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6

374

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

somewhat harder case. How, one might ask, can the death penalty deter
future offenders if no future offender will ever be put to death? The answer
is that by imposing the death penalty against those currently on death row,
prospective-only repeal “communicate[s] to all criminals that they will be
held to account for their crimes in the manner in which the law provides
when they commit them.”309 Through prospective-only repeal, the
legislature is making absolutely clear to future offenders that it means what
it says—that they should be under no illusion that a change in law
tomorrow will spare them the consequences of their actions today.
Offenders sentenced to death will not benefit from the subsequent repeal of
the death penalty, any more than future offenders sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) will benefit from some yet-to-beenacted repeal of LWOP down the road.310 “Future offenders beware,” the
legislature is saying. “You get what we say you get, not what we say as
modified by what we haven’t said yet (in future legislation).”
c. Cases Giving Retroactive Effect to Prospective-Only Repeal
Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment or State Corollaries
Few cases address the constitutionality of death sentences post-repeal
under the Eighth Amendment or its state corollaries. As discussed above,
upon finding that the legislature intended the repeal to be prospective-only,
courts have overwhelmingly given effect to the legislature’s intent.311 In the
few cases addressing the constitutionality of death sentences post-repeal,
courts have generally upheld those sentences.312
309. NM’s January 2011 Response, supra note 3, at 10 (emphasis added); cf. People v.
Gilchrist, 133 Cal. App. 3d 38, 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the “disparity created by
rendering different sentences after an admittedly arbitrarily chosen date . . . does not violate equal
protection principles because of the legitimate public purpose of assuring ‘that penal laws will
maintain their desired deterrent effect by carrying out the original prescribed punishment as
written’” (quoting In re Kapperman, 522 P.2d 657, 659 (Cal. 1974))).
310. Cf. David R. Dow, Life Without Parole: A Different Death Penalty, NATION (Oct. 26,
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170852/life-without-parole-different-death-penalty (discussing
the unfairness of LWOP).
311. See supra Subsection III.A.2.a; cf. Dillon v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010) (“We are
aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term
of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent . . . [ameliorative] amendments.”); Hunt v. Nuth, 57
F.3d 1327, 1335 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that, by refusing to give retroactive effect to the
prospective-only repeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had “implicitly held” that there was no
constitutional violation).
312. See, e.g., State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 216–17 (Tenn. 2000) (rejecting Eighth
Amendment challenge to death sentence based on prospective-only legislation requiring jury to
consider sentencing option of life imprisonment without parole); Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506,
515 (Ind. 1999) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to a death sentence based on a prospectiveonly repeal of the death penalty for people with intellectual disabilities); id. (“We do not find today
sufficient objective evidence of contemporary standards of decency which demonstrates that a
categorical exemption of the mentally retarded from the death penalty is mandated by the Eighth

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/6

62

Barry: From Wolves, Lambs (Part I): The Eighth Amendment Case for Gradua

2014]

FROM WOLVES, LAMBS (PART I)

375

Importantly, two state supreme courts have declared the death sentences
of those with intellectual disabilities unconstitutional after their legislatures
repealed the death penalty prospective-only for such people. In 1989, in
Fleming v. Zant,313 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that it was cruel and
unusual punishment under the Georgia Constitution to execute death row
prisoners with intellectual disabilities after Georgia repealed its death
penalty prospective-only for people with such disabilities.314 While
acknowledging the absence of a “national consensus” against the execution
of people with intellectual disabilities, the Fleming Court found a
consensus “among Georgians” based on the state’s (prospective-only)
repeal, coupled with the subsequent passage of a Georgia Senate resolution
“urging [its] Board of Pardons and Paroles to give special consideration to
commuting the sentences of mentally retarded offenders.”315 In a vigorous
dissent, Justice Smith argued that the majority’s retroactive application of a
clearly prospective-only repeal “usurp[ed] legislative power,” upending an
“express[ion of] the people’s legitimate concern for finality.”316 “Senate
resolutions,” Justice Smith further argued, “do not express the will of the
majority of the citizens of this State; they express the will of the Senator or
Senators who introduced them” and therefore do not support retroactive
Amendment.”); see also Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 786 (Ind. 1997) (stating that there may be a
moral argument for exempting “mentally retarded criminals from the death penalty,” but the
legislature and the Governor specifically legislated “a statute of repose for claims of mental
retardation in capital cases . . . rather than amending the Constitution or leaving the act open-ended
for judicial interpretation”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; infra notes 358–
61 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Alcorn’s rejection of an Eighth Amendment
challenge to a prospective-only law that allowed the jury to consider the sentencing option of
LWOP); cf. United States v. Santana, 761 F. Supp. 2d 131, 162 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting
argument that “there is an Eighth Amendment violation from sentences under the [repealed statute]
because such sentences would no longer serve any of the permissible purposes of criminal
punishment (retribution, deterrence, etc.). Simply put, the import of Marrero is that if Congress
does not expressly provide that it intends the new law to be applied retroactively, then there is no
frustration of the purposes behind the new law, or, therefore, anything improper, in not applying it
retroactively” (citation omitted)).
313. 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989).
314. Id. at 343 (“[W]e conclude that the execution of mentally retarded offenders violates the
Georgia constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.”); see id. (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he legislature specifically limited the applicability of the statute to ‘the trial of any
case in which the death penalty is sought which commences on or after July 1, 1988 . . . .’” (second
alteration in original) (quoting statute repealing death penalty for persons with intellectual
disabilities)). The court’s decision in Fleming to apply a prospective-only repeal retroactively to
people with intellectual disabilities is in striking contrast with its 1966 decision in Cobb v. State,
152 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 1966), in which it refused to give retroactive effect to a prospective-only
repeal of the death penalty for people who were less than seventeen years of age at the time of their
offense. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
315. Fleming, 386 S.E.2d. at 342.
316. Id. at 343–44 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“It is not this Court’s prerogative to determine social
policies; the power to determine policy questions rests in the legislative branch, not the judicial
branch.”).
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application.317
In 2001, in Van Tran v. State,318 the Tennessee Supreme Court went
further, holding that it was cruel and unusual punishment under both the
Tennessee and federal constitutions to execute death row prisoners with
intellectual disabilities after Tennessee repealed the death penalty
prospective-only for people with such disabilities.319 In that case, the court
relied on a national consensus against the execution of people with
intellectual disabilities, as evidenced by, among other things, Tennessee’s
(prospective-only) repeal of the practice, other states’ repeals, public
opinion polls, and jury sentencing data showing an opposition toward the
practice.320 The court also relied on the lack of penological objectives
served by the death penalty in this context, given the reduced culpability of
people with intellectual disabilities.321
Two other cases involving the retroactive application of prospectiveonly death penalty repeals deserve mention. In 1989, in Cooper v. State,322
the Indiana Supreme Court held that it was “inappropriate” to execute a
death row prisoner who committed her crime at the age of fifteen after
Indiana repealed the death penalty prospective-only for people who were
minors at the time of the offense.323 Invoking the “more intensive level of
scrutiny” demanded by its state constitution in capital sentencing
decisions,324 the court concluded that the defendant “would be both the
first and the last person ever to be executed in Indiana for a crime
317. Id. at 344.
318. 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001).
319. Id. at 809 (“[W]e hold that the execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to achieve
legitimate penological objectives for punishment as required by the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.”). Unlike Fleming, the
repeal statute at issue in Van Tran was silent as to retroactivity—not explicitly prospective-only.
See id. at 797 (stating that the repeal statute “provided only an effective date of July 1, 1990, and it
contained no other specific language requiring retroactive application”).
320. Id. at 801–04. The court also ostensibly relied on a consensus within Tennessee. Id. at
804–05.
321. Id. at 806–09.
322. 540 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989).
323. Id. at 1219 (“‘This act does not apply to a case in which a death sentence has been
imposed before September 1, 1987.’” (quoting An Act to Amend the Indiana Code Concerning
Children Accused of Murder, Pub. L. No. 332, § 3, 1987 Ind. Acts 3040, 3043)). Legislative history
further clarified that the repeal was intended to be prospective-only. See id. (“The bill’s sponsors
declared openly that [the prospective-only provision] was purposeful. . . . [I]t was apparent that the
authors wished to enact a general policy without the passion that legislating on a particular case
would arouse.”). The court’s decision in Cooper that it was “inappropriate” to execute a person who
was a minor at the time of the crime is in striking contrast with its decision ten years later in Rondon
v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1999), in which it refused to give retroactive effect to a prospectiveonly repeal of the death penalty for people with intellectual disabilities. See supra note 151 and
accompanying text.
324. Cooper, 540 N.E.2d at 1218; see id. (noting “[t]he thoroughness and relative
independence of this Court’s review” of death sentences).
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committed at the age of 15,” which “ma[de] her sentence unique and
disproportionate to any other sentence for the same crime.”325 Significantly,
the court did not find the sentence to be cruel and unusual under the state
constitution; rather, its decision was based on its mandatory review of
“whether the sentence of death is appropriate” in light of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.326
In reliance on Cooper, the Indiana Supreme Court in Saylor v.
Indiana327 held that it was “inappropriate” to execute a person who was
sentenced to death by a judge over a unanimous jury recommendation
against death after Indiana eliminated such overrides prospective-only.328
Of particular importance to the court was the fact that the prisoner was
“one of only three individuals currently under a death sentence despite a
jury’s recommendation to the contrary.”329
In Fleming, Van Tran, and Cooper, state legislatures repealed the death
penalty prospective-only for those whose particular characteristic—
intellectual disability or age—reduced their culpability and susceptibility to
deterrence.330 In Fleming and Van Tran, the courts held that a consensus—
either state or national—had emerged against execution of those who
shared the characteristic, thereby making it cruel and unusual to execute
them.331 In Cooper, the Indiana Supreme Court took a different tack,
holding that it was “inappropriate” (but not cruel and unusual) under its
state constitution’s heightened standard of review to execute a person who
was fifteen at the time of the offense.332 Taken together, these cases stand
for an unremarkable proposition: a characteristic that diminishes
culpability and susceptibility to deterrence must diminish it for all who
share that characteristic.333 This proposition has no traction here.
325. Id. at 1219–20 (emphasis added).
326. Id. at 1218 (“The object of this review is to assure consistency in the evenhanded
operation of the death penalty statute.”). The court also found the execution to be in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, but grounded its analysis in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), which declared that it is unconstitutional to execute a
person under a death penalty statute that, like Indiana’s, “specifies no minimum age at which the
commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender’s execution.” Id. at 1220–21 (“We are
persuaded that Indiana’s statute fits under Thompson v. Oklahoma and violates the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution.”).
327. 808 N.E.2d 646 (Ind. 2004).
328. Id. at 650–51; see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013
legislation) (“For a defendant sentenced after June 30, 2002, . . . if the hearing is by jury, the jury
shall recommend to the court whether the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, or
neither, should be imposed. . . . If the jury reaches a sentencing recommendation, the court shall
sentence the defendant accordingly.”).
329. See Saylor, 808 N.E.2d at 651.
330. See supra notes 313–26 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 313–21 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 322–26 and accompanying text.
333. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (“Unless the imposition of the death
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In the context of prospective-only repeal of the death penalty in toto,
there simply is no shared characteristic that reduces offenders’ culpability
or undermines the goal of deterrence. In fact, prospective-only repeal has
nothing to with offenders’ characteristics at all. Rather, it has to do with the
wisdom of the death penalty going forward—a “complex factual issue the
resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures.”334 In sum,
prospective-only repeal of the death penalty, unlike characteristics such as
youth or intellectual disability, does not undermine offenders’ personal
responsibility for their crimes or the deterrent impact of their punishment.
The penological goals of retribution and deterrence are served by
imposition of the death penalty against those sentenced to death, whether
carried out before or after repeal.
Among the cases in which courts have given retroactive effect to
prospective-only repeals under the Eighth Amendment or its state
corollaries, Saylor is perhaps the most difficult to distinguish. In that case,
the statutory text was absolutely clear and there was no mitigating
characteristic at issue like age or disability.335 What appears to have been at
the heart of the court’s decision was fundamental fairness—that “commonlaw principle [with a] . . . constitutional dimension,”336 which requires
“that government minimize arbitrariness in its dealing with individual
citizens.”337 Given the sympathetic facts of that case, which involved a
unanimous jury recommendation against death and the defendant’s being
one of just three people under a death sentence despite a jury
recommendation to the contrary, the court relied on its “intensive” standard
of appellate review to remedy the perceived unfairness.338
3. Unconstitutional as Applied: Furman Arbitrariness
In addition to the Supreme Court’s Atkins line of cases, one might
argue that, under Furman v. Georgia, prospective-only repeal is
unconstitutional as applied to those currently on death row because of its
penalty on a mentally retarded person ‘measurably contributes to one or both of the[] goals [of
retribution or deterrence], it is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain
and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punishment.’” (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 798 (1982))).
334. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (plurality opinion), quoted in Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008).
335. See supra notes 327–29 and accompanying text.
336. James R. Zazzali et al., Panel II: The Death Penalty on Appeal: Constitutionality,
Equality, and Proportionality Review, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 95, 97–98 (2008).
337. State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 319 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., dissenting).
338. Saylor v. Indiana, 808 N.E.2d 646, 650–51 (Ind. 2004). For in-depth discussions of
fundamental fairness in the context of prospective-only death penalty repeal, see generally Barry,
From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra note 1, and ACLU-CT Brief, supra note 90, at 3–8; see also
infra notes 377–80 and accompanying text; supra note 209 (discussing Judge Lumpkin’s dissents
rejecting a fundamental fairness argument in the context of prospective-only repeal).
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arbitrary and capricious selection of those to be executed.339 In Furman,
five justices, each writing separately, agreed that, in the absence of
standards to guide capital sentencing, the imposition of death is arbitrary
and capricious in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment.340 Justice Stewart stated:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual. . . . [P]etitioners are among a capriciously selected
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact
been imposed. . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and
so freakishly imposed.341
Justice White likewise decried the lack of any “meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty was] imposed
from the many cases in which it [was] not.”342 For Justice Brennan, “the
conclusion [wa]s virtually inescapable that [the death penalty was] being
inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smack[ed] of little more than a lottery
system.”343 For this and other reasons, Justice Brennan concluded, the
death penalty was unconstitutional per se.344
Of particular concern to the two remaining justices in the majority was
the complexion of the “random handful”345 on death row. According to
Justices Douglas and Marshall, the death penalty was “pregnant with
discrimination,” disproportionately targeting poor people and people of
339. See 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding “the death penalty in these cases”
unconstitutional), construed in CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 23–24 (recognizing the “dominant
theme . . . [as] the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.”).
340. See id.; see also CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 23–24. Although this “arbitrary and
capricious” rationale also sounds in due process, Furman was decided under the Eighth
Amendment (as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment). See Furman, 408 U.S. at
240. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh’g granted and vacated on other grounds
by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972), a case decided just one year before Furman, the Court
held that standardless capital sentencing did not violate the Due Process Clause. See id. at 207 (“In
light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite
impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce
life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.”); see also Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 599 (1978) (plurality) (“Thus, what had been approved under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in McGautha became impermissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by virtue of the judgment in Furman.”).
341. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
342. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
343. Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
344. Id. at 305 (“The punishment of death is therefore ‘cruel and unusual,’ and the States may
no longer inflict it as a punishment for crimes.”).
345. Id. at 248 n.11 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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color—an arbitrary and capricious criteria for death if ever there was
one.346 “Regarding discrimination,” Justice Marshall wrote, “it has been
said that ‘[i]t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the
member of the minority group—the man who, because he is without
means, and is defended by a court-appointed attorney—who becomes
society’s sacrificial lamb.’”347 Like Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall
concluded that the death penalty was therefore unconstitutional per se.348
Given the majority’s concerns in Furman, one might reasonably argue
that nothing could be more arbitrary and capricious than allowing
eligibility for the death penalty to depend on the date of one’s crime.
Despite its superficial appeal, this argument misunderstands Furman’s
reach. At issue in Furman was whether the discretion of juries was
adequately channeled, “thereby reduc[ing] the likelihood that it will
impose a sentence that fairly can be called capricious or arbitrary.”349 As
the Court subsequently explained in Gregg, a case in which it upheld the
constitutionality of Georgia’s death penalty sentencing procedures:
Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.
....
. . . [T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty
of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner
can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the
sentencing authority is given adequate information and
guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best
met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at
which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information
relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with
standards to guide its use of the information.350
The operative term here is “sentencing authority.” The Furman Court was
concerned that juries’ “unbridled discretion in determining the fates of
those charged with capital offenses” created “a substantial risk that the

346. Id. at 257; see id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
347. Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hearings on S. 1760 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 11 (1968)
(statement of Michael V. DiSalle, Chairman, Nat’l Comm. to Abolish the Death Penalty)).
348. Id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he death penalty is an excessive and
unnecessary punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment.”).
349. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1976) (plurality opinion).
350. Id. at 189, 195 (emphasis added).
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punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”351
Importantly, the Court was not concerned with the discretion of
legislatures to change their sentencing laws. And for good reason. As noted
by one of Furman’s four dissenters, the legislature possesses a
wide range of power . . . to adapt its penal laws to conditions
as they may exist and punish the crimes of men according to
their forms and frequency[.]
....
. . . [L]egislative judgments as to the efficacy of particular
punishments are presumptively rational and may not be struck
down under the Eighth Amendment because this Court may
think that some alternative sanction would be more
appropriate.
....
. . . To do so is to usurp a function committed to the
Legislative Branch and beyond the power and competency of
this Court.352
This general warning applies with special force to prospective-only repeal,
by which the legislature has decided to abolish the death penalty on a
selective basis. Again, one of the Furman dissenters stated:
The legislatures are free to eliminate capital punishment
for specific crimes or to carve out limited exceptions to a
general abolition of the penalty, without adherence to the
conceptual strictures of the Eighth Amendment. . . . If
legislatures come to doubt the efficacy of capital punishment,
they can abolish it, either completely or on a selective
basis. . . . An Eighth Amendment ruling by judges cannot be
made with such flexibility or discriminating precision.353
Because the legislature’s decision to repeal a law has nothing to do with a
jury’s decision to sentence a person to death, and has everything to do with
the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches,
Furman is inapplicable to prospective-only repeal. As the Court in Gregg
made clear, if “the sentencing authority is apprised of the information
relevant to the imposition of [a] sentence and provided with standards to
351. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (plurality
opinion) and Furman, 408 U.S. 238); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion) and Furman, 408 U.S. 238); see also id.
at 428 (“It must channel the sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards that provide
specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death.” (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
352. Furman, 408 U.S. at 432, 456, 458 (Powell, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 403–04 (Burger, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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guide its use of the information,” the risk of an arbitrary and capricious
sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment is removed.354 The
sentence does not suddenly become arbitrary and capricious because the
legislature decides to repeal the death penalty prospective-only at some
later date. In short, Furman concerns whether a jury’s sentence of death
was arbitrary and capricious, not whether a state’s eventually carrying out
that sentence might be.
The absurdity of applying Furman to prohibit execution post-repeal is
clear when one considers the risks at stake. The risk that concerned the
majority in Furman was that the procedures used to sentence a person to
death were arbitrary and “pregnant with discrimination,” thereby rendering
the sentence constitutionally defective.355 In the prospective-only repeal
context, the risk is not that the death sentence is somehow defective, but
that it will be carried out at all. This, of course, is not the kind of “risk” that
bothered the Court in Furman. It is not arbitrary and capricious for a state
to actually do what the jury has directed it to do; the fact that a state has
abolished the death penalty going forward at the time it carries out a jury’s
sentence does not change this determination.
Indeed, it is no more arbitrary and capricious for a legislature to
maintain its death row intact after prospective-only repeal than it is for one
state to abolish and another to retain the death penalty. As Justice Burger
stated in Furman, the fate of those on death row is “controlled by a
fortuitous circumstance,” but “this element of fortuity” does not render the
death penalty’s imposition arbitrary and capricious.356 These decisions are
the exclusive prerogative of state legislatures and, while they may be
inconsistent, they are not constitutionally defective, “for no human
institution performs with perfect consistency.”357 Were the Eighth
Amendment to require this kind of absolute consistency, the death penalty
would not be permitted in any state under any circumstances.
Furthermore, a determination that prospective-only repeal is arbitrary
and capricious as applied to those on death row, when taken to its logical
conclusion, would mean that every prospective-only change in sentencing
law that reduces punishment for a particular crime necessarily violates the
Eighth Amendment. This has never been the law. As discussed above, the
rules of statutory construction suggest exactly the opposite.358 The case of
State v. Alcorn is instructive on this point.359 In that case, the defendant
argued that application of a savings clause “resulted in arbitrary or
capricious application of the death penalty and thus cruel and unusual
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion).
See supra notes 341–48 and accompanying text.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 389 (Burger, J., dissenting).
Cf. id. (discussing consistency with regard to juries).
See supra Subsection III.A.1.
638 N.E.2d 1242 (Ind. 1994).
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punishment” because it denied him the benefit of “jury instructions on life
imprisonment without parole . . . based simply on an arbitrary fact that the
crime occurred before June 30, 1993.”360 The court rejected this claim,
holding that “[t]he mere application of the saving clause will not result in
cruel and unusual punishment.”361
In the end, an Eighth Amendment challenge to prospective-only repeal on
the grounds that it is arbitrary and capricious is really an equal protection claim
in disguise, and should be analyzed as such.362 Indeed, “[the Court] h[as] never
before held it to be cruel and unusual punishment to impose a sentence in
violation of some other constitutional imperative.”363 Although the Eighth
Amendment proves a limited vehicle for challenging prospective-only repeal, a
companion article, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The Fourteenth Amendment
Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, concludes that the
Fourteenth Amendment is weaker still.364 Prospective-only repeal is
constitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
4. Policy Considerations Regarding the Eighth
Amendment’s Reach
Policy considerations undergirding the Court’s Eighth Amendment
analysis also support prospective-only repeal. In its death penalty
jurisprudence, both the Court’s majority and its dissenters have expressed
dueling concerns over the reach of the Eighth Amendment. The dissenters
warn that “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet”; standards of decency
do not necessarily evolve toward abolition, they may also evolve the other
way.365 “[T]emporary consensus on leniency for a particular crime,” as
Justice Scalia originally stated, does not “fix[] a permanent constitutional
maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and
responding to changed social conditions.”366 Were that the case, the Court
in Furman would have declared the death penalty unconstitutional per se
after executions dramatically declined after World War II and ground to a
360. Id. at 1246.
361. Id.
362. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 390 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“It must be noted that any equal
protection claim is totally distinct from the Eighth Amendment question . . . . Evidence of a
discriminatory pattern of enforcement does not imply that any use of a particular punishment is so
morally repugnant as to violate the Eighth Amendment.”).
363. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 352 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana,
554 U.S. 407, 464 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment provides a poor vehicle for
addressing problems regarding the admissibility or reliability of evidence . . . .”).
364. See Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra note 1.
365. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 466 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas,
JJ., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991) (Scalia,
J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
366. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 990 (Scalia, J.), quoted in Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 466 (Alito, J.,
joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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halt beginning in 1968.367 “The mistaken premise of the decision,” Justice
O’Connor has stated, “would have been frozen into constitutional law,
making it difficult to refute and even more difficult to reject.”368
The majority, on the other hand, advances the opposite concern. When
it comes to the death penalty, the Eighth Amendment is not too strong (a
“ratchet” in the dissenter’s usage); rather, it can never be strong enough.
Given its “unique . . . severity and irrevocability,”369 the Court must be
“most hesitant before interpreting the Eighth Amendment to allow the
extension of the death penalty. . . . [D]ecency, in its essence, presumes
respect for the individual and thus moderation or restraint in the
application of capital punishment.”370 Accordingly, the Court’s job, as the
majority sees it, is to be a formidable gatekeeper, “confining the instances
in which capital punishment may be imposed.”371 If the screw is to be
turned away from abolition, it must be for a very good reason.
Prospective-only repeal upsets neither the majority’s nor the dissenters’
view of the Eighth Amendment. Prospective-only repeal is not, after all, an
“extension of the death penalty.”372 It is exactly the opposite—a retraction
of the death penalty, albeit a measured one. Therefore, it would be strange
for courts to object to prospective-only repeal on the same grounds that the
Supreme Court in Kennedy objected to a law that made rape punishable by
death.373 The former abolishes the death penalty while preserving the status
quo for those on death row; the latter radically alters the status quo by
expanding the list of crimes punishable by death.
Striking down prospective-only repeal as applied to those on death row,
moreover, would lead to the very result criticized by the dissenters. It
would prevent states “from giving effect to altered beliefs”(that those on
death row should die, but no one else should) and freeze into constitutional
law a standard (“Complete repeal or no repeal”) that some states do not
share.374 If prospective-only repeal is prospective in name only, these states
may simply choose not to abolish the death penalty at all, thereby
fossilizing their standard of decency rather than allowing it to evolve. As
367. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 854–55 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
368. Id. (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 855 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
369. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality
opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
370. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
371. Id. at 437; see also id. at 420.
372. Id. at 435.
373. See id. at 437, 441 (“[T]he death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim’s
life was not taken. . . . Evolving standards of decency are difficult to reconcile with a regime that seeks to
expand the death penalty to an area where standards to confine its use are indefinite and obscure.”).
374. See id. at 466 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990
(1991) (Scalia, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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an en banc panel of the Sixth Circuit recently acknowledged in the noncapital context, the “Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet that makes a
harsher system of penalties unconstitutional the moment a more lenient one
is (prospectively) adopted, a theory that would have the perverse effect of
discouraging lawmakers from ever lowering criminal sentences.”375
To further the dissenters’ analogy, prospective-only repeal will not
loosen the screw one iota; it will not cause abolition’s frame to come
tumbling down. It merely allows states to turn the screw at their own pace,
and to gather more hands to do so. If prospective-only repeal is not
permitted, courts will not only have required states to use a ratchet (in the
sense that the screw must turn toward abolition, not away), but to ratchet
with a zeal that outpaces the ratcheter (in the sense that the screw must turn
toward prospective and retroactive abolition). Ironically, this may leave
retentionist states without the hands needed to perform the task before
them; they may forgo picking up their tools altogether, stunting progress
that might otherwise have been made. The House of Abolition needs walls,
and prospective-only repeal is one way to build them.
5. Summary of Eighth Amendment Analysis
Prospective-only death penalty repeal does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Because the death penalty remains constitutional per se, the
Eighth Amendment permits states to abolish the death penalty without
wiping their death rows clean. Although the death penalty has been found
unconstitutional as applied in a variety of circumstances, those
circumstances do not apply here. First, unlike in Atkins, there is no national
consensus against prospective-only repeal; in fact, recent repeals in New
Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut, and Maryland suggest the opposite to be
true. And because those remaining on death row post-repeal share no
unifying characteristic that diminishes their culpability or susceptibility to
deterrence, legitimate penological goals are served by preserving their
death sentences intact. Second, unlike in Furman, the death sentences at
issue are not “pregnant with discrimination”; they were arrived at under a
constitutional scheme and they remain constitutional post-repeal.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
Over the past five years, a new trend has emerged in death penalty
abolition—that of gradual abolition. State legislatures in New Mexico,
Connecticut, and Maryland have abolished the death penalty prospectiveonly, that is, for everyone in the future, and the executive in each state has
375. United States v. Blewett, Nos. 12-5226, 12-5582, 2013 WL 6231727, at *13 (6th Cir. Dec. 3,
2013) (“Withholding the benefits of a change from previously sentenced defendants at any rate is not
‘unusual,’” the Sixth Circuit further noted, but rather “is the general practice in federal sentencing, as
Dorsey and § 109 confirm.”).
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been unwilling or unable to commute the sentences of those on death row.
As a result, a total of eighteen men in New Mexico, Connecticut, and
Maryland remain on death row post-repeal.
This Article answers three fundamental questions raised by prospectiveonly death penalty repeal. The first question is a pragmatic one that is
being asked by advocates of abolition: Is prospective-only repeal helpful to
abolition? This Article concludes that it is. Prospective-only repeal is a
retraction of the death penalty, albeit a measured one. States like New
Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland are evolving, one might say; they are
just doing it more slowly. Some advocates will say that supporting
prospective-only repeal is equivalent to “betting against one’s own horse,”
but this depends on how one characterizes the horse. If the horse is a
prisoner who remains on death row post-repeal, it is true that prospectiveonly repeal does not help him. But then again, prospective-only repeal does
not hurt him either. It does not accelerate in the slightest his march to the
death chamber; all it does is preserve the status quo. If, on the other hand,
the horse is a Supreme Court decision declaring the death penalty
unconstitutional per se, prospective-only abolition is a better bet. Thirtythree states retain the death penalty and all of them have prisoners on death
row.376 Odds are good that prospective-only repeal will be an enticing
option for many of these states. While abolition’s principles may be at odds
with prospective-only repeal, abolition’s progress may not be.
The second question is a moral one, which has been advanced by
legislators on both sides of the death penalty debate: Is prospective-only
repeal morally coherent? In other words, is it moral to cast a vote that will
prohibit the death penalty for some but not all? This Article concludes that
while it may be immoral to punish people with death, prospective-only
repeal is not about punishment; it is about ending punishment. By retaining
the death penalty for some so that no others will ever face a similar fate,
legislators arguably transform an immoral punishment into a moral
sacrifice. This is the uneasy morality of gradual abolition; by dying, those
on death row destroy the death penalty.
The third and last question is a legal one to be decided by the courts: Is
prospective-only repeal permissible under the law? This Article concludes
that, as a matter of statutory construction, clearly prospective-only repeals
are not given retroactive effect. Constitutional questions are admittedly less
straightforward, especially given the novelty of legal challenges to
prospective-only death penalty repeal. Nevertheless, the overwhelming
weight of authority suggests that prospective-only repeal is on firm ground.
Under the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty remains constitutional per
se, and an “as-applied” challenge under Atkins or Furman fares no better.
There simply is no national consensus against prospective-only repeal.
376. Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4.
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Most legislatures have abolished the death penalty prospective-only.
Although some executives have commuted the sentences of those
remaining on death row post-repeal, others have kept their death rows
intact. Furthermore, the “group” to which the death penalty is to be applied
post-repeal has been sentenced under a constitutional, non-arbitrary
scheme, and its members share no characteristic diminishing their
culpability. A companion article, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The
Fourteenth Amendment Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty,
concludes that prospective-only repeal is likewise constitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
The strongest basis for striking down prospective-only repeal is
fundamental fairness—that “penumbral right reasonably extrapolated from
other specific constitutional guarantees,”377 which is “at the heart of AngloAmerican law and . . . independently influence[s] the construction and
application” of the law.378 For hundreds of years, courts have permitted the
State to kill its killers; now courts will have to decide whether the State can
sacrifice them. As Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in Furman, the
Constitution does not look kindly on states that make “sacrificial lambs” of
their citizenry.379 If fundamental fairness prohibits anything, it may well
prohibit this.380
And so Abolition’s eyes are now on Connecticut. As I have previously
observed:
If the Connecticut Supreme Court applies Connecticut’s death
penalty repeal retroactively, it will be reason to rejoice. It
means that the court has defied its own precedent and the
precedent of other federal and state courts, and has discovered
a ram in the thicket of death penalty jurisprudence, a better
angel to avert the sacrifice.
But if the Connecticut Supreme Court upholds the death
penalty in this case, we should not lament. Instead, it is time
for the gradualists to move. Bottle prospective repeal and sell
it to every state with the death penalty. And as we use
prospective repeal to win states to the abolitionist cause, let us
use every tactic we can to delay to the executions of those
who remain on death row. Delay them long enough to win
over that magic number of states that will lead the U.S.
Supreme Court to abolish the death penalty for good.381
377. State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513, 519 (N.J. 1985).
378. Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 955 (1984) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 335–74 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental fairness).
379. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
380. For an in-depth discussion of this argument, see Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra
note 1.
381. Barry, supra note 91.
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